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INTRODUCTION
During recent years some western observers asserted that the
Chinese Communist movement is a real nationalistic campaign,
without showing in detail just how the Chinese Communists have
been conducting this nationalistic campaign.

The writer, as a

native Chinese, felt that some interpretation should be made of
the matter tor western observers.

Thus, the topic of this thesis,

"Anti-Foreignism in the Chinese Communist Appeal," was adopted at
the suggestion of a member ot the Loyola University Faculty.
The subject matter of this paper is not intended to disprove
such Western interpretations; it is intended rather to supplement
them by showing how the Chinese Connnunists have utilized the
historical Chinese anti-foreign movement to induce the Chinese
people to hate foreigners.

Within the subject matter there are

two aspects to be dealt with, namely, anti-foreignism itself and
the Chinese

Co~~unist

appeal to it.

The latter aspect is the most

important and 1s mainly discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.
The term tfanti-foreignism·' is one adopted by Nestern writers.
Most of Chinese intellectuals do not concede that there was or 1s
any anti-foreignism in China.

These Chinese intellectuals use the

term tlpatriotism" in place ot anti.foreignism, though the meanings
1

ii
of these two terms are in discrepancy.

They use the tlpatriotism tl

because they regard activities against foreigners as defensive and
patriotic movements.

The writer, however, believes that basically

there is anti-foreignism in China, and that it might even be
regarded as race prejudice.

He believes that because of the

repeated military defeats of China in the past, anti-foreignism
has become stronger than ever before.

Therefore, he is inclined

to think that the term ttanti-foreignism" is more suitable.
Chapters are arranged chronologically.

The first chapter

attempts to show the characteristics of anti-foreignism before the
Revolution of 1911.

In this way, the problem of terminology

mentioned above---anti-foreignism and patriotism---would be solved
Further, although evidences of modern Communism did not appear
before the Revolution, some examples of the anti-foreign movement
cited in the first chapter have been repeated under Communist
operation during the revolutionary course of China.

Therefore, it

might be said that the anti-toreign events in the early days are
relevant to those of more recent t1mes.
The second chapter, which covers the period 1911 to 1930,
discusses the anti-foreign movement's new tide under the influence
of Communism:

tirst, the influence of Communism on sun Yat Sen

in carrying on the anti-imperialist tasks, with an analysis of
Sun's influence on his tollowers, second, the Communist theories
on the anti-imperialist revolution were selected because they were

p

iii
regarded as applicable and attractive for the Chinese revolutionar
mind.

Consequently, same cases of the attacks against foreigners

are cited in this chapter.

Evidences of the Communist influence

and cooperation behind the seene of anti-foreign events were
introduced.
From 1931 to the last World War resistance against Japan had
been the Chinese public demand, and the "United Front" against
Japan became the main tactical slogan of the Chinese Communists.
Therefore, in Chapter III discussion is ooncentrated on the
Communist anti-Japanese campaign, which had greatly aided the
development of the Chinese Communist movement.
The Decent Communist ttanti-American and pro-Russian" program
must be dealt
IV.

wit~,

of course, and this is the subject of Chapter

Emphasis 1s put on anti-American movement 1n keeping with the

subject.
Materials ooncerning Communist statements and propaganda
were oollected either from the writings of ComT.'lunists themselves
or from other writers, most of whom have been first-hand observers
in the Chinese Communist areas.

No material was taken from Kuo

Min Tang sources in order to avoid possible misinterpretation or
exa.ggeration.
A great percentage of materials concerning the Chinese antiforeign movement used in the opening two ohapters was taken from
Western

writers~

who are assumed to be fairly objective.

Most

iv
of them have been in China.
This thesis stJ-lves to evaluate the Chinese anti-foreign
movement as a soclal faotor in·Chinese Communist growth.

But it

does not conolude that Communism in China is a "new nationalism tf
as Clement Attlee insisted in August,

1954.

The Chinese Communist

-

have made ..........
use of nationalism to help them in their struggle toward

..-..-....~

theiJ- Communist goal.
Furthermore, sinoe the Chinese Communists came into power,
they have made every effort to create a new anti-American and proRussian movement, which is contrary to the Chinese traditional
feeling.

Traditionally, the attitude of the Chinese public toward

Amerioans is ratheJ- more favorable than toward Russians.
According to the Communist teachings everything American is evil,
and everything Russian is good.

Thus, inevitably a great deal of

fabrication and exaggeration has been inserted in the Communist
teachings, as we shall see in Chapter IV.

Psychologically

speaking, if the Chinese Com'1'lunists continue to teach their people
that only America is the imperialist and the enemy of the Chinese
people, and that only Russia 1s the democratic leader and the
friend of the Chinese people, which is contJ-ary to the fact and
the Chinese feeling, a general psychical reaction would renew a
deep hatJ-ed against Russia and the Red regime.
1s also the purpose of this paper.

This expectation

-

CHAP'EER I

TH.E ROOT AND NATURE OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM BEFORE 1911
As a preliminary to a discussion of the Communist influence
on the anti-toreign movement in China, anti-foreignism itself
must be evaluated.

The root and nature of anti-foreignism must be

explained, since Ohinese intelleotuals have rationalized antiforeignism as patriotism, since anti-foreignism is traditional and
responsible for the attacks on foreigners of the last few decades,
and since it created the Chinese psychological demand, which has
been utilized by the Chinese Communists in th&ir campaign against
"foraign

imperiali~.n

In explaining the cause of anti-foreignism, Chinese intellectuals used to assert that the foreign aggressors put an
"imperialist yoke on China"; the foreigners "despise Chinese";
the Great Powers intend to "slice up China."

However, any real

explanation must deal with what might be called Chinese "ethnocentrism, tt the psychological factor revealed by Chinese history,
which accou.nts for the hostile attitude toward foreigners.
In the early days, the Chinese knew little or nothing about
the other peoples of the world.
1

They held in their minds a

2

picture of themselves as a nation of superiority and supremacy.
They did not like intercourse with the foreigners, whose conduct
they despised. l

It may be worthwhile to present some specific

examples of ethnocentrisM or the Chinese feeling of supremacy.
The portuguese after 1514 made the first real attempts to
establish diplomatic relations with China for the purposes ot
trade.

In 1517 Thomas Pires was sent to Canton as ambassador by

the King ot portugal.

But at the end ot 1519, because ot a rumor,

he and his companies,were accused ot being spies and imprisoned
under an order of the Son of Heaven.

Later, the Portuguese

government sent Simon d'Andrede to be an ambassador.
dealing with the Chinese officials he got trouble.

In his
He was attack-

ed by a Chinese fleet in a Chinese coast and only a storm which
scattered the ships enabled him to escape. 2 The reason tor such
treatment is simple.

The Son of Heaven in Peking reigned in

ceremonious majesty, and refused to accept any other ruler as an
equal.

He conSistently endeavored to reduce dangerous contacts

with outer world. 3

The Spanish and Dutch, to1lowing the Portu-

guese, had the same trouble with China during the years 1588 to
lChao Kao-Min, Essay ~ Chinese ~ Foreigners, (Mukden,
China, 1925), p. 20.
2a.F. Hudson, h~rOte and China, A surve of Their Relations,
From the Earlist Times ......
0 mO, (London, lCj3 )-;-PP. 236.,... 231.
.......-..

----

-

3Ibid., p. 235.

t

J
Before the end of

ei~hteenth

century England made a great

effort to open direct diplomatic relations with China and to
obtain a treaty regulating the trade.

In 1792 Lord Macartney was

appointed ambassador to China and sent out with instructions to
press tor the opening of ports, but he was unsuccessful.
England tried once more but tailed again.

In 1816

The mandate of the

Chinese Emperor Chtien Lung to King George III implied that China,
being the only civilized nation of the world, had no use for
foreign goods.5
As time went on, the efforts of foreigners to obtain trade
with China met with some success, because Chinese merchants came
to desire foreign trade.

The provinCial authorities, for a con-

sideration, permited it,.,and the officials of the central

gover~

ment pretended not to notice it, as long as there was no question

ot diplomatic reoognition.
upon as

"barbari~nsn,

Since the foreign traders were looked

the Chinese provincial authorities set up

certain rules regulating the behavior of both the Chinese and
foreign traders in order that the Western "barbarians" could not
contaminate the "superior" Chinese.

It was forbidden that Chinese

merchants be in debt to foreigners; on no account could Western

43 •

Wells Williams,

83-85.
5Hudson, p. 266.

PP. 80-81, PP.

! History

££ China,

(New York, 1891),

-4
traders hire Chinese servants.

Europeans were prQhibited from

using sedan chairs; no foreign traders were allowed to row on the
river except at specified times three days a month when they had
to be aocompanied by a Chinese interpreter who was held accountable for their misdeeds, when the trading season was over, the
foreign traders had to leave China; only a few foreigners could
live in the Chinese factories, if a trader strayed, it meant certain death. 6
In the sixteenth oentury the Chinese spoke of themselves as
"we," the chosen people. the people of glorious destiny, the
saviours of civilization. whereas ttthey"---the foreigners---were
the inferior people, the unworthy_

The physioal appearance and

the conduct ot westerners were so unoouth and "barbaric" according
to Chinese "standards" tha.t they were looked upon in no sense
truly human by the Chinese people.

One scholarly Chinese observer

who met a number of Jesuit priests in his travels wrote a letter
to his friend that these nocean men lt are tall beasts with deep
sunken eyes and beak-like noses; they had hair on their bodies
like the monkeys of Southern China, they seem to possess none of
the mental faculties of men, although they are in some aspects
clever and go from place to place with self-reliance of a man of
scholarship;

it is quite possible

------.--------232.

6Arnold J. Toynbee, ! study

£!

that they are

susceptible

Ristorl, (London, 1934), II,

~~

training and could be taught the modes of conduot proper to a

human being, but it would take oonsiderable patienoe. 7
As time went on, new .forms of hatred against "foreign devils"
appeared.

A Western expert on Ohina, who was the former president

of the Imperial University of Peking during the Manchu dynasty.
stated: "So tar trom being new, an anti-toreign spirit is the
normal state of the Ohinese mind • • •

• Where everything is

ehangin&, the temper of people has undergone a ohange.
beoome restless as the sea and tickle as a weather wave.

They have
The

friends of yesterday are become the enemies of today; and a slight
or petty annoyanoe is enough to make them transfer man or oountry
from one to the other category.

Murderous outbreaks, rare in the

past, have now become alarmingly trequent. u8

An instanoe at suoh

an outbreak would be the Boxers' Rebellion of 1900, in whioh more
than three hundred westerners were killed.

The slogan of Boxers

was ItFu-Ohtlng Mleh-Yang" ("assist Oh'ing Dynasty a.nd destroy
ocean men' It)
Ohristianity came trom the West to China.

Consequently

Christianity was looked upon as merely another foreign thing by
tM Chinese literati; the missionaries were denounced as seditious
disturbers ot the civilized Chinese SOCiety.

!2sl,
...n....

_I

The Christian missio

7Rlchard T. La Piere and Paul R. Farnsworth. Social PSlcho2nd ed., (New York, 1942), p. 154.
~w. A. P. Martin, ~ Awakening

;-1111

£!

China, (London, 1907) •

6
was never to enjoy uninterrupted prosperity in China.

In 1616 a

severe persecution arose because a Chinese official, jealous ot
the Catholic scholars, hated them.

Under his agitation an edict

was entorced at Peking and Nanking; several toreignmisslonaries
were apprehended and sent to Macao.

In 1622, due to the activity

of the same hostile official, the persecution was renewed and
again the missionaries were forced either to tlee or to go into
hiding.

Again the reason urged was that foreign missionaries were

seditious.9
The work of Christianity in China during the last years of
the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) and the first years ot the Manchu
dynasty (1644-1911) was rudely interrupted.

Chinese astronomers,

jealoua of the Jesuits who had imported the Western calendars. 1n
1664 took advantage ot the ignorance of the very young ruler,
Ktang Hsi, to launch an

accusat~on

against the foreign

m!ssion~

As a result of this accusation twenty-five missionaries

aries.

were taken to canton and imprisoned, and three of them died of
their sU£ferings.10
From 1723 to 1736 the Church was overtaken by a more severe
persecution than it had known betore.

The basic cause are that

the Chinese literati had a deep-seated distrust of the white

-

9Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Historl of Christian Mission in
China, (New York, 1929), p. 103.-10 Ibid., P. 115 •

-

7
missionaries, and there was a fear that the increasing numbers of
missionaries might lead to foreign aggrhssion.
and in January

l72!~

In December 1723

a great number of missionaries in }4uchow we.r>e

expelled and the church buildings were confiscated, and the
Christians had to renounce their faith under edict. ll
In the year
Fukien province.

l7~7

a violent attack on the Church broke out in

The Spanish priests and the Vicar Apostolic ot

Fukien were arrested and
were strangled. 12

~trangled.

Two huropean Jesuits also

As time went on the anti-Ohristian movement beoame more and
more fierce.

The Chinese people, like the pagans of anc1ent Rome,

charged the foreign missionaries with horrible crimes, and seized
the slightest occassion tor murderous attack.
missionaries

and

Cases of murdered

of fabricated accusations against them were

fairly common in the past history ot ChIna. 13

The missionaries

were accused of killIng the little children in the mission orphanages and foundling hospitals for the sake of obtaining their
hearts and eyes for magical purposes.

such accusations occurred

in the cities ot Kuangtung and Szechuan in 1884 and 1886,
respectively.

12Ibid.,
-

In 1890-1891 the attacks on missionaries occurred

llIbid., Pp.
159-161.
.
p. 163.

....
8
in widely separated localities and were accompanied by much
violence. 14 These charges or accusations were usually made by the
masses, and led by the prominent members of gentry.15

Similar

charges are made by the Chinese Communists of the present.
Charges of kidnaping children and selling them for immoral
purposes were also made in the Chinese Courts.

In tilay 1870, a

number ot children had disappeared in Tientsin, and rumor charged
the Catholic orphanage with responsibility.

As a result of this

chnrge the Catholic Cathedral, orphanage, and French Consulate

.ere destroyed; priests, nuns, and French men and women were
killed. 16

"In China," Martin wrote, "if a man falls in the street

the priest and Levite consult their own satety by keeping at a
distance, and if a good Samaritan stoops to pick him up it is at
perll."17
The Chinese people over the centuries have hated foreigners;
at the same time they held a prejudice against those Chinese who
adopted, more or less, Western culture or who studied abroad.
An instance to show how a Chinese offioial refleoted this bias
toward students studying overseas is reflected in the experience

14Edward Thomas Williams,
1928), pp. 353, 389.
l5Ibid ., p. 354.

l7Martin,

16 Ibid., pp. 324-325.
p. 262.

! Short History £! China, (New York

9
of Yung Wing, the first Chinese student who studied in Amerioa.
He was graduated by Yale University in 1854.

He later beoame the

Commissioner, then of the Government of Manohu, and sent one hundred and twenty Chinese students to study in the United states.
These students, before oompleting their ourioula, were oalled baok
in 1881.

The reoall was due to the intrigues of biased offioials.

One of the hostile offioials was Woo Tze-Tung, Yung Wing's new
oommissioner.

00-

He opposed Yung Wing's plan and in 1876 sent

Peking reports with malicious misrepresentations about the
students.

Yung Wing in his own biography wrote about Woo Tze-Tung

as follows,
Instead of laying those oomplaints before me, he
clan-destinely started a stream of misrepresentations to
Peking about the studentsJ how they had been mismanaged
• • • how they had been allowed to enjoy more privileges
than was good for them; how they imitated American
st'ldents in athletios; how they play m01"6 than they
studied, that they formed themselves into seoret societies,
both religious and political; that they ignore their
teachers and would not listen to the advioe of the new
commissioner; that they were allowed to have their own
way, they would soon lose their love for their own
country, and on their return to China, they would be good
for nothin,g or worse than nothing; that most of them went
to Church, attended Sunday sohool and had became
Christians; that the sooner this educational enterprise
was bI"oken up and all the students reca.lled, the better
it would be for China, 8tc.l~
Why were the Chinese usually
Weste1"n ways of life as above?
18 yung Wing, ~ ~
po. 204-205.

.!.!!

sO

hostile to the learning of

A typical interpretation of anothe

China ~ Ameri oa, (New York, 1909),

10

Chinese official who had resided in England for years asserted
that "Our civilization is • • • a moral order; while in yours we
detect only an economic chaos."

And European civilization "has

produced manners so coarse, morals so low, and an appearance so
unlovely" that there could be no comparison with Chinese
standards. 1 9
About religion this Chinese official said, "Your religion
has less influence on your society; you protess Christianity, but
your civilization has never been Christian."20

Again he went on,

"tour religion is less practical and it is not for the unity of
human race." ,Furthermore, "Your religionJ

Alas, it is in the

name of that you are doing unna..'l11able deedsl 1t21

The teachings ot

the Church on asceticisM, priesthood, heaven and hell, and
spiritual and temporal life, are all satirized by the same Chinese
orricial. 22

VJhat is the Chine se religion?

through and the through'

"Ours is Contucian

But to sa.y that it is Conf'ueia.n, it is

llorall"23

19Letters From A Chinese Official (Being an Eastern View of
W•• tern Civl11zitI'OnT, [origInally puba.ished in Enp.:land, and then
published tl}e U. s. i1 (New York, 190), po. 5, 10.
20·
6
Ibid
. , p••

2l~., pp.

22.!.2!.2..,

p.

6, 24, 5lt-.
55.

23Ibid
- . , p •6
•

L:----------J

-11

Concerning arts and literature, the otficial criticized the
west this way: "Your outer sense as well as your inner is dead,
you are blind and deat."24

His 1dea was essentially that every-

thing concerning China is better than the things of the west;
even to send children to school in Europe could not do any good
for the family and SOCiety since the Chinese d1d not send their
children to sOhool. 25 Europeans are "poor", "incompetent", and
"foolish" 1n oomparison with Chinese people. 26

It is curious

enough that the official also wrote that "no man in China is
isolated,f1 and "it is not so easy for him to starve;" also a
Chinese "has no temptation to cheat and oppress. tt2 7
This Chinese official retlected a general attitude of the
Chinese intellectuals toward Western civilization and an oppositio
to the learning ot the west.

The Chinese students who studied in

toreign countries returned in disgraoe, and the old literati
looked upon them with suspicion.
experience.

This is true even 1n the writer'

Students returning from abroad heard sarcasm, such

a8 "The moon in a foreign country must be brighter than that in
China since everything of

-

24Ibid. , p. 29.

-

25Ibid. , po. 2, 8.
26llii!., pp. 24, 27.

-

27Ibid. , p. 27.

tor~igners

is better than that of

12
Chinese, your parents are no longer your paren.ts because you are
democratic now'"

The writer has heard from his former teachers in

China that "We have everything what the foreign countries have,
don't self-belittlel
westerners.

Many things had been learned from Ohina by

'Weapons and guns, making paper, printing, compass,

and so forth, were invented by Chinese, which the westerners
learned from us; we have a civilization ot five thousand years,
while other countries are small and have but short histories."
This is the general notion ot Chinese and something that Chinese
people like to talk about.
The Chinese not only despised Caucasoid foreigners; they despised the Japanese as well.

According to Chinese history, the

Japanese people haYe nothing ot a natiye culture except that
which they learned and adopted trom China, and the ancestors ot
the Japanese are the Chinese who were sent to Japan in 219 B.C. by
the Shi Huan Ti, the king ot the T'sing dynasty.

Since the

Japanese people are physically shorter than the Chinese in general

the apoellation of "Japanese ft was not used by the Chinese in
ancient times.

The Japanese had been called "Wo Nu ff ("shortie-

Ilave n ) trom the beginn:i.ng of sixth century by the Chinese.
the tourteenlih century the Japanese had been nicknamed

Mter

"wo Kow"

("shortie-pirate") by the Chinese historians of the Tang dynasty.
!here tore !l~fo Nu" or "Wo Kow" has been used in the textbooks of
~ ~dern China, and the oountry or Japan has been styled as "Wo Kuo"

13
("shortie-nation't).

The Chinese people, particularly women, do

not like to marry Japanese.

Although some instances of mixed

marriages occur, a Chinese who married a Japanese would evole the
criticism of his countrymen.

The basic reason is that the Japanes

is regarded as "brutal", "wild" or "short tt •

Realistically, while

the Chinese have oontempt for the Japanese, they also have a fear
of them because ot repeated deteats at the hands of the Japanese;
contempt and tear engender hatred.

"Down with the small Japan'"

became a slogan in China.
There is now a general agreement among the Chinese intellectuals that during the very early days the Chinese acted against
foreigners because of ignorance, which is not, of course, to be
justified; but that in more recent times the anti-foreign attitude
and movement should be justified on the ground that the Chinese
people had to fight for abolition of the unequal treaties.

Dr.

Sun Yat Sen laid down his teaching that "the aim of revolution is
to achieve the freedom and equality of China."

However, when we

study the very nature of the anti-foreign attitude in modern China
we will discover it is not entirely as interpreted.

For instance,

during the twentieth century no tairminded person would insist
that missionaries are "culture aggressors," but they, particularly
the Catholic foreign pdests, are leoked upon with suspicion.

~e seminarians in China, regarding their education in the

~roreigntl mission seminary, used to say that "we are under the

~..

It

slave-education!"

For another example, a servant of the Catholic

foreign priest would sometimes say that "we have the worst food,
while they, the foreign priests, have the best; there is no
equality of man to man!tt
It is worth noting that the writer holds that the Chinese
anti-foreignism is intrinsically rooted in the "ethnocentrism,tt
aggravated by a history of diplomatic humiliations, which have
brought about a psychologioal tendency of hostility toward all
"foreign devils."

And, psychologically speaking, such a general

tendency has been expoited by Chinese Communists in their struggle
for power.

Since this chapter was basically intended to deal with

the Chinese anti-foreignism before the Revolution, the nature of
historical anti-foreignism in modern China will be analJzed more
broadly in the following chapters when the Chinese Communist
appeal to it is oonsidered.

--------------------------------------------------------~

L...

CHAPTER II
THE ftNEW TIDE" OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM UNDER
COMMUNIST rr FLUENCE (1911-1930)
After the outbreak of the Republio Revolution in 1911, something in China began to be new.

A magazine edited by the £ounder

of the Chinese Communist Party was renamed !!! Youth in September
1915.

Between 1917 and 1921 nearly four hundred student reviews

appeared in China, most ot them containing the character for "new"
in the title, such as:
Hew Tide. l
-

!!! Women, !!! Light, !!! World and even

In an atmosphere receptive to new ideas, Huxley's

Evo1ution~

Ethics, Darwin's Origin

Evolution, Spencerts Principles
Montesquieu's
Adam Smith's

~

Spirit

~ ~.

£!

£!

Species, Kidd's Social

Sociology, Mill's .Q!! Liberty,

Rousseau's Social Contract, and

!h! Wealth 2£ Nations became favorite readings and

provided questions for dtsoussion in student circ1es. 2

The rise

-

1Robert Payne, Mao Tse-Tung, Ruler of China, (New York,
1950), pp, 56-57.
---2Kiang Wen-Han, The Chinese Student Movement, (New York,
1948), p. 22.
---

15

16
of modern Communism was contemporary and communist influence gave
a new impetus to the anti-foreign movement.
In dealing with the Communist influence on the new tide of
anti-foreignism, the teachings of Sun Yat Sen must be discussed at
first, because the anti-imperialist movement received its early
impetus from Sun, who was influenced by Communism.
Sun Yat Sen's Teachings
What is the feeling of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the Father of the
Republic Revolution, regarding the "imperialist" pressure on
China?

His early declaration shows:

"Our strong neighbours look

down upon us and despise us for the reason that we are not one at
heart • • ••

If we do not rouse ourselves in time, our thousands

of years of fame and culture, our many generations of traditions
and morals will be destroyed, utterly ruined."3
In a message to the Chinese people from overseas, he repeated
his feeling that "we are men without a oountry.
foreign la.nd. we are assaul~ed. '·4

When we go to

But later he expressed his

teeling in terms of their political lmportance.

"China has been

3sun Yat Sen, "An Address to Hsing-ChtmfS-Hui" (Association
tor the Regeneration of China), (made in 1894J. The Teachin~s of
~ Yat Sen, selections with introduction by N.-aingulee,
Lonaon,
~p:l1.

43un Yat Sen, !fA message to the Chinese People" (written in

1903), Gangulee, p. 29.
f

-
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under the po:).itical domination of the

~<vest

for a century," Sun

stated, and "during the past century China has lost a huge amount
of the territories. tl5

Economioally, he realized that "China has

already endured several tens of years of economio domination from
the Powers • • • •

The result is that China is everywhere beoomin

a colony of powers.,,6

Stung by intolerable humiliation, he devote

his life to lead ,the task of the "emancipation of China from the
imperialist yoke."

It is Sun Yat Sen who advanced the slogan,

"Down wi th Imperialism," wx-i tes a ~'estern observer. 'I

To fight

imperialism Sun Yat Sen preferred to use methods evolved by
Communist theory, though he also adopted some of his ideas and
principles from the American president Lincoln.
That his attitude should be oriented to Communism is rather
easily explainable.

During 1896-1898 he studied Marxism in Europe

and was influenced by it. 8

Mox-eover, the success of the Russian

ReYolutlon of 1917 ap'oealed to him deeply.
a congratulatory message to Lenin.

PArly in 1918 he sent

He was informed that Lenin

was giving his attention to the oppressed peoples of the East and

5sun Yat Sen, ~ Min Chu 1 (Three peOile's prinoiples),
trans. FrankW. Price, ~uhgKing ealtion, 94j}, p. jj.
6Ibid., pp. 37-38.

-

p. 81:GUstov

Amann~ !h!

Le8ac1

£! ~ 1!l~, (New York, 1929),

8Tang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution,
( London, 1930), p. 2~
- -
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had the intention of presenting a united front against the
imperialist nations of the weat. 9

In addition, the Paris Peace

conference of 1918 offered only disapoointment for China.

Chinese

intellectuals were so shocked that they cried that the foreign
nations were still selfish and militaristio and all were great
liars.

About ten thousand students paraded in the streets to
demonstrate against the Paris Conference. 10 Besides all this, on
July

4,

1918, Chioherin, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs of

Russia, declared that Bolshevik Russia had unilaterally renounoed
all unequal Czarist treaties with China, as well as its agreements
with Japan and other countries relating to China.

This declara-

tion was again set forth in a manifesto issued on July 25, 1919. 11

In the years between 1919 and 1921.severa1 members of the Comin
were working for the development of Communism in China.

In 1921

Lenin sent his secretary Mahlin to influence Sun Yat Sen.

In

October, 1923, Borodin arrived at Canton and said to Sun:

"Your

aim is to fight foreign imperialism Which is also our aim • • • •
!he ultimate aims of the Ku.o Min Tang and the Third International

ar8 not in conflict. n12

Borodin even became the adviser of Sun

9Ibid., pp. 154-155.
lOKiang Wen-Han, p. 37.

2Dd IlHaro1d Rovert Isaac, The Tragedy of the Chirese Revolution,
8d., (stanford, 1951), p:-60.
----lZrang Leang-Li, p. 159.

~
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of the Foreign Ministry thereafter. 13

Thus, 1t is not surprising

that Sun's teachings implied some Communist ideology.
According to Sunts own testimony there was no such ca)1talist
problem in China as in E..'u.rope. 14

And "China has not yet large

land owners up to the present time," wrQte Sun, 'tshe only has had
small landowners," therefore "all the Chinese people must be
counted as poor • • ••

Most places in China have been qu1et and

oontent under this system and no tl'oubl·e has arisen between the
people and landowners."IS

Nevertheless, Sun added, "In reoent

years, however, since the currents of Western economic 11fe have
begun to rush into China, all of our old systems have undergone a
process of change.

~he

land question has felt the first and most

serlous effects of the modern ~vest.rn impact. n16
theory 1n forming his

"p~inciple

He used Marxist

of People's L1velihood" which was

intended to solve the "economic dom1nat10n" and '·serious impact"
of Western Powers.

After a lengthy explanation of his principle

he concluded that ttI can put distinction today between Communism
and

the Min-Shen.princ1ple [principle of People's LivelihoodV in

this way; Communism is an ideal of Livelihood. while the Min-Shen

13I2!£., pp. 160, 212, 233, 214.

-d.

l4sun Yat Sen, The Internat10nal Development
(London, 1928), PP7 10, 139, 166.
l5 sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 41'7-418.

~~ ••
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Principle is practical Communism.

There is no real difference

between the two principles, the difference lies in the methods by
which they are applied. tt17
people t s Ll velihood?

He went on, "What is the Principle ot

It is communism and socialism. ,,18

At !:\Oothe

time he added that the "Russian Revolution is the same as that of
San Min Chu r."19

Although sun in some places attacked Marxts

theOry,20 he called Marx "the most famous schola.r of the world,"
claimed "he ['Marx] found the truth," and !this [Mar.x0 book is the
complete work ~or the human social thought of thousands of yearsV 2

.

At the same time, Lenin, according to Sun, was 'ta genius among the
revolutionists, !Uld the best standard of the .Revolutlon.,,22

Such

words of praise are Qommon in Sun's writings.
To aohieve the aim of the Republic Hevolution Sun felt that
some sort of unit,. wi th I,enin's U ~S.S.R. was indispensable.

He

stated, "Russia aims to cheek the strong and help tile wea1c; it
advocates justice. • ••

18 Ibid ., p.

17Ibid., p.

Russia's new policy aims at the over-

416.
428.

19sun Yat Sen,

an address on t'The Interpretation on the
Establishment of the Republic Gover·nntent" t (made in 1923,) quoted
in Taue Shu-Tien, Sun Chung-Shan Yu KU~-Chien Chu I (Sun Yat Sen
and Communism), (Hong Kong, i<i;li"r;-p..
- - - - -

--- --

20 Sun , San Min Chu I, pu. 401-406.
-..--

...........

'

21Q,uoted in Taue Shu-T1en, pp.

6, 7.

22Quoted 1n Tsue Shu-Tien, p. 7.
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throw ot imperialism in the whole world; it aims at the overthrow
of the capitalism of the world. H2 ) A letter of sun sent to the
Central Executive of the U.S.S.R. betore his death in 1925 stated:
While I li. here, My thoughts are turned toward
you and towards the fate of my Party and my country.
You are at the head of the Union of free Republics
---that heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the
world by the immortal Lenin. With the aid of that
heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably
achieve emancipation from that international regime whose
foundations have been rooted for ages in slavery, wars,
and injustice.
I leave behind me a Party which, as I always hope,
will be bound ~p with you in the historic work of the
final liberation of China and other exploited countries
from the yo~e of imperialism • • • •
Therefore I charge the Kuo Min Tang to continue the
work ot the reVolutionary nationalist movement, so that
China, reduced by the imperialists to the position ot
semi-eolonial country, shall become free.
Taking my leave of you, dear comrades, I want to
express the hope that the 4&1 will soon come when the
U.S.S.R. will welcome 8. friend and ally in a might, free
China, and that in a great strugglt for the liberation
of the oppressed peoples of the world botp those allies
will go forward to victory hand in hand.2~
The importance of Sun's

~eachings

1s obvious.

One might

raise the questiQn of whether or not Sun tat Sen was a Communist.
A.lthough neither the Kuo Mln Tang nor Chinese Communists cla1.med
that Sun Yat Sen was a Communist, some Western authors hold a
doubtful attltude. 25

-

The important thIng is that he made statemen

-- ------

-

23sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, po. 17, 18, 20.
-....-,

2~tuoted in Hu Hua, ChUB! Kuo Rain Min Chu Chu I Ko Ming Sh~~
Historl of Chinese New emoera~RiVOlutron), Ipeking , l~)
Pp. 50-57. The letter also Is In Gangulee, pp. 55-5,).

(Ih!
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which can be effectively used by Communists in the fighting of
foreign imperialism.

To study Sun Yat Sents teachings was

required in all Chinese middle schools and universities for some
years after the beginning of the period of politioal tutelage
under the Kuo Min Tang.

Students who learn the history of the

repeated military defeats of China, are likely to be susceptible
to Sun's principles.
Furthermore, after Maroh 1927, the Kuo Min Tang under the
leadersh1p of Wang Chin-\Ye1 (1884-1944) and Chiang Kai-shek began
to

expel the Communist Party from the collaboration government,

which had been established by sun Yat Sen in 1924-

Military clash

between the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communists had ensued
from that time.

On April IB, 1927, Chiang arrested some Communist

leaders in Shanghai; again on April 21 he arrested the Soviet
Union "adviser" BorodinJ and under' Chiang's order more than one
hundred Red leaders were executed in Shanghaicwithout tr.tal. 26
loreover, from 1927 to 1931 the Kuo Min Tang government broke
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had been directing the Chinese Communist conspiracy to capture the Kuo Min Tang.
SUch events dId not conform to the teachings of Sun, as illustrated

in the last letter to the c.nt~al Executive of the U.S.S.R.,

York, 1931.1->, PP. 280-281. Aocording to the present writer,
Ch1nese Comrnunists do not regard Sun Yat Sen as a Communist
because Sun did not adopt Marxism absolutely.

L __26...JTw.w!ih,IAh.iN[eu.IW~y~rCOI!E:r'Ii-i:k:T~1Lmue,

1~2·'l.1.,j........&1~ 27a....J;nl.l-.......
1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _....J

JIl,a.....;A&Jln;aI':r:.11,...

QIs:../,.,
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quoted above.

The Ch1nese Communists, therefore, from early days

had cried out: "Kuo Min Tang's men are the traitors

or

Sun Yat Sen

and his revolution," "Kuo Min Tang is the running dog of imperialists," and "Kuo Min Tang is the anti ..revolution camp."

The

young Chinese students, remembering the words of Sun, could hardly
be unimpressed by such charges.
Four Chinese Communists' Theories
Chen Tu-Hsius

~

Fighting Foreign Imperialism

Chen Tu-Hsiu (1881-1942), the co-founder and

the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, believed that the
repeated defeats of China were due to the Manchus. ignorance
"democracy and science."

or

In his writings before 1919 Chen did not

fall into Leninism absolutely.

To liberate China Chen insisted

that "democracy and scienee" were the pr'1ncipai needs.

Since he

realized the Republic Revolution failed, he accepted MarxismLeninism in toto by September 1920. 21

In Deoember 1920 Chents

magazine !!!! Youth carried his article which exolaimed: "They
accuse the Bolsheviks 'or disturbing the peace.

Do not the Great

Powers disturb the peace when they violate the sovereignty of
l1I1all and weak cou.ntriesy t128
According to communist theory, the class struggle of peasantr

21S e .1a.min I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise
(Cambridge, Ma ••• , 1951), p. 29.
.;...;.._....0....;.;......... -

~ 28Quoted in rug ••

p. 22.

or

1':'ao

-

-

jii>
,....

and proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the important stage of
the development of Communism.

But to the Chinese Communist mind

such struggle "is not only compatible with, but necessary to, the
Chinese anti-imperialist, national revolution."29

Therefore, a

great emphasis was put on this aspect by the Chinese Communist
leaders.
Since Chen believed that the basic aims of the Chinese
revolution should be "to overthrow the oppression of international
imperialism and to achieve the complete independence of the Chines
nation," he considered that the bourgeoisie (mainly the intellectuals] ought to lead the proletariat and peasantry in the struggle
against foreign imperialism,30 because the latter were immature

tor political action and they would incline toward conservatism. 31
Also, Chen was willing to support the polioy of collaboration with
the Kuo Min Tang, whioh had been decreed by the Comintern.
Later Chen changed

his attitude.

In 1926 he stated, "The

peasantry oonstitutes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people, and

is,

of course, a great

torce in the

national

29"Circular Letter of the CC [CCp] to all Party Members~'
(August 1, 1921), cited in Bejamin I. Schwartz, A Documenta~
Ristorl £! Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Mass.,-1952), p. 164.

3°Hu Chiao-Mu. ~iatl Years of Communist P£ri~ of China.
(Peking, 19$1), pp. , J a!so ViCtor A. Yakhon 0 , The ChInese
§oviets, (New York, 193 ), pp. 122, 125.

---- ....... -- --- ......

31schwartz, Chinese .;:;.;:;;,;:;.;;;,:;:;;;:;;;.;;;:;;.::;;.;;;;
Communism and the Rise of Mao, p.

48 •

revolut1on."32

Chen concluded that "1f the Chinese revolution

does not en11st the peasants, . it will be most difficult for it to
succeed as a great national revolution. H ]3

At the same time Chen

evaluated highl,.. the role of the proletariat.

"Because the 1forld

has already moved into the stage of the world revolution," wrote
Chen, nand because the Chinese proletarlat has already demonstrated that it has 1ts own independent political power and that it 1s
actually the leader of the present revolution, our aims • • • are
national independence and the overthrow of the feudal society.n34
In his same statement Chen insisted that the Chinese revolution 1s a part of the world revolution.

Therefore, Chen maintain-

ed that 111n conjunction with the tide of world revolution we shall

oombine our forces w1th the forces of the world revolution" to
achieve Chinese national independence. 35
Formerly Chen had supported the policy of the Kuo Min TangCommunist alliance, mentioned above.

But in April 1927, he

32Chen Tu-Hs1u, Chun Kuo Kuo Min Ko MinS Yu Shah Hu1 Ko
~ (The Chinese Revol'UtronanCI-thevarlous Classesor-cElnes-e.;..;.;;;,........•
~1.ID, p. 41 •• cited In Sohwartz, IbId., p. 65. -

-

33Ibid. ,

3~hen TU-Hsiu, "Tu Chen Chi Shen" (nThe Voice of Readers"),

•.a~~

£h2!

nWartz,

.3.5_
Ibid
e

Pao (Weeklv Gllide), No. 160 (June 30, 1926), cited
p. 63.

-iora.,

deelar$d: "It would be a mistake to consider the Kuo Min Tang as a
revolutionary Party" and "i1; is only a bloc of leaders," and "we
have be£ore us the task of beginning to build a real revolutionary
government. "36
Li Ta-Chao:

Li Ta-Chao (1889-1921), the co-founder of the

Chinese Communist Party, was as much attracted by Lenin's revolution as was Chen Tn-Hsiu.

In an article dated October 1918 he

conceived the victory of Bolshevism as the foundation of the
Chinese Revolution.

"The.real victory is not the victory of allie

against Germans, but the victory of BolSheviks • • • •

Hence-

forth all national boundaries, all dIfferences of classes, all
barriers to freedom w111 be swept away • • • •

The Russian

Revolution has shaken off the last dismal autumn leaves from the

tree of world • • • •

Thus, the victory of Bolshevism is the

Yictory of the sp1rit of all mankind."31
1i fO't.ln4ed the Ma-Ko-Sau-Chu-I Yen"'Ch1u-Hui (The Society for
the study of Marxism) at Peking University in 1918.
..re made up primarily of students.

- --

Its members

L1 also was the editor ot

RI1n Chao (New Tide) and co-editor of Chents New Youth.

-.-....-.......

Both

per10dicals carried L1's man_ articles advocating Bolshevism as

-

~

36Cited in Leon Trostsky, Problem of the Chinese Revolution,
Shachtman, (New York, 1932),p. -rJ.
.

woan •• Max
loa,.

101 37 L i Ta-Chao, "Bolshevik Ti Shen-1i ft ("The Victory of

.hevism") Rein ChinS Nien, V, No.5 (1918), pp. 443-447.,
_ted in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of l1ao, p.

-------
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the instrument to reseue China :f"rom imperialist oppression.
Aocording to Li, the proletariat and the peasantry should be made
consoious of the national independence and aware of the evils of
oapitalists and imperialists in China.

1J!ost of the foreigners

were accused by Li of being imperialists.
In 1926 and 1927 Li opposed the Communist collaboration with
the Kuo Min Tang on the ground that "there is contusion of thought
1n the Kuo Min Tang and its principles are extremely unolear re-

garding the Chinese revo1ution."3 8

During the earlier period of

the Chinese revolution Lt.s influence on the student circles was
DO

less than that of Chen Tu-Halu.
Li Li-San:

After Chen Tu-Halu was removed from the position

of general secretary of his party in August 7. 1927, the leader
actually fell to Li Li-San, though the general secretary of the
Party was Chu Chtiu Pal.

Lits doctrine prevailed from the end of

1927 until he was reprimanded and exiled by the Party to Moscow
1n January 1931.

Li stubbornly bent his efforts to organize the

working class in the cities.

.hip a part"

cir~u1ar

In November 1928 under his leader-

insisted that without the proletariat in the

eity, there could be little prospect of victory in the rural area.
ter, he felt that the time was ripe for general armed revolt in
cities.

The oity, he maintained, is the oenter of :f"oreign

38 ~loted in 3chwartz, ibid., p.

-

41.
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imperialism and capitalism, the main supports ot the reactionary
camp. 39
Originally, Li and most of Chinese Communists falt that
American financial imperialism was quite willing to countenance
a program of sham reform in China on the part ot its bourgeois
puppets.

But the Comintern ot Moscow retused to allow the Chinese

Communist Party to differentiate between the American and other
torms ot "imperialism."

A letter trom Executive Committee ot

communist International to the Chinese Communist Party dated
February 9, 1929, censured this whole line ot reasoning:

"The

American policy toward China like that of British and Japanese is
an imperialistic policy.

ot application.

The difference lies only in the methods

The American 'open door' policy is not designed

to remove China trom a colonial status.

It is a liberal hypocrisy

meant to prettify imperialist aggression."40
In a contession ot past errors which appeared in partycircular ot April 1929, the leadership stated: "We must encourage

39Robert S. Elegant, China's Red Masters, (New York, 1951),
.
209; "Mu-Chfien Cheng-Ch1h Hsing-Shih Yu Chlu-Chung Kung-Tso"
fin"Present
Political Conditions and Mass Activities"), p_ 42., cite
Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 129.
";;"';;';.;;..;.0.,;,0;.;=_ _ _ _ _ _ _

...............

_ _

4o"Kun-Chlen Kuo-Chi Chi-Rain Wei-Yun-Hui Yu Chung-Kuo-KunOhien Tang Shuif ("Letters ot Executive Committee ot Communist
f:iernational to the Chinese Communist Party"), quoted in Schwartz
d., Pp. 130-131.
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the masses to oppose imperialism, particularly American imperialis
for while the masses can rather easily grasp the evils of Japanese
and British imperialism, the crafty policy of the United states
might easily lead the masses astray, particularly since they have
been subject to the bourgeois reformist deception.

We must there-

fore stress the aggressive poliCies of the United states which
wishes, as it were, to suck the marrow of our bones and which is a
hundred times worse than Great Britain or Japan. ff 41
Of course Li, as the other Communists, insisted that "the
victory of our revolution must fix irrevocably the victory of the
world-wide revolution. tt 42

However Li could not hold his leader-

ship permanently because he lost the struggle for political power
within the Party.

During the last twenty years leadership fell

into the hands of Mao Tse-Tung.
Mao Tse-Tung: Mao.s main policy was mobilizing the poor peasants. Mao in 1926 stated that in semi-colonial China the landlor
,

and compradors have been the vassals of the international bourge-

oisie, depending upon foreign imperialism for their existence and
development. 43

The poor peasants, who constitute 10 per cent of

4l"J:I'an-Chun-Fa Chan-Cheng-Chung Ti Kun-Tsou Fang-Chin" ("Our
Policy on Activities against the Wars among the Militaristsff),quot
-N_ Communism and the Rise __
8d in Schwartz, ____
Chinese
of ___
Mao, pp.13l-l32.
_~~~__

~

~

~

4 2Elegant, p. 210.
43 Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Soviety"
~. . ~954itten in March, 1926), Selected Works of ~ Tse-Tung (London,
,
), (PP. 13-20) I, 13.
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the Chinese rural popu1ation,44 have been exploited and oppressed
by the imperialist elements for years.

Therefore, tithe leadership

of the poor peasants i8 absolutely necessary-til "without the poor
peasants thel"e can be no l"evolution.,,45
Accol"ding to Mao, the middle cl&as---Itnational bourgeoisie tt .. - .
would not favol" the Chinese revolution.46 A certain group among
the petty bourgeolaie--- n students, school teachers, lower government .functionaries, office clerks, and petty traders"---, who had
been economically self-supporting and victimized by the oppression
and exploitation ot the imperialists, began to real1ze the foreign

era as ttroreign deVils. u 47

But this group, Mao believed, have

telt uncertain or the suceess of the movement against the imperial.
lsts and have refused to join the reVolution because the
have had so much power behind them. 4B

:foreigner~

However, Mao continued,

when the revolutionary upsurge could arise and the dawn of victory
would be discernible, the small group and even the rest of the
petty bourgeoisie would come to jo1n the

ant1~1mperialist

revolu-

tlon.

~ao. "Report of an Investigation into Peasant Movement in

-

Hunan" (written in March, 1927), ibid.,(pp. 21 ....59), 31.

45Ibld., 32.

14.

46Mao ,

"Analysis of the Classes 1n Chinese Soc1ety,"

~.,

47!2.tc!., 15, 16.
~: ___4_8.I_bi_d~.~'~l~6~.____________________________________~
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Mao also regarded the proletariat---"industrial workers"---as
an important force in the revolutionary movement.

The industrial

workers were able to fight foreign imperialists because they had
been subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the capitalists
and imperialists.49

Nevertheless, the proletariat in China,

according to Mao's estimation, only numbered two million at that
time. 50

For the earlier period of the revolution, the proletariat

could not carry the heavy burden of military task.

1~e

main force

of the Chinese revolution must come from peasants, particularly
poor peasants.

This idea had been repeatedly insisted on by Mao

Tse-Tung in his later reports.
Concerning the peasants, Mao's tactic was that the Communists
must expand

political agitation

nists should utilize every

among the peasants.

opportunity to enrich the content and

clarify the meaning of these slogans---"Down with the
"Down with

the local

The Commu-

bulies and bad gentry,"

"Equality," and "Unequal treaties'"

Imperialists~

"Freedom,"

These slogans, as Mao saw

them, would be more useful than "ten thousand schools of law and

49Ibid., 19.

·

50 Ibid• Mao did not

indicate whether the term "proletariat"
In comparison with
other estimations which were made in the early period of the
.public China it seems that Mao defined the proletariat as
tactory workers. For the details of the number of workers see
W. Woodhead, ed., Ie! China ~ Book, 1931, (Shanghai, 1931),
lnclude~l worker or only factory workers.

!

~Ol-502.
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politioal scienoe" for the peasant mI1Ita.nce. 51

To show his

theory correct Mao reported what he saw: "These political slogans
are flying about eVerywhere, entering into the head.s ot adults,
youngsters, old men, children and women in oountless villages • •

• •

If a group of children is at play and if you see one ot them

get angry at another, you will instantly hear the shrill cry,
"Down with Imperialism,u52
In 1928 Mao changed his ideas somewhat.

He called on the

communist members to pay a balanced attention to the rural peasantry and the urban proletariat and petty bourgeoisie.

For the

industrial workers employed in the foreign factories the Communist
must widely propagate the slogan ot "all factories to the workers.
For the urban bourgeois the Communists must carry out the policy

ot "turning them 1nto proletarians and then forcing them into the
revolution."

He particularly warned that an "ultra-Left" ?011cy

ot attacking the petty bourgeois would drive most ot them to the
11de of imperialist-warlord camp.53

In early 1930 Mao made an analys1s of the revolutionary
phenomenon in China based on the "Political Resolution of Sixth

In

51 Mao , UReport ot an Investigation into the Peasant Movement
Hunan;' Selected Worka .£! !!!2. Tee-Tung, I, 49, 50.
52~., p. 50.

5311&0, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?tt (written

lt

006~ober

,+,65.

1928), Selected Norks of Mao
...
- -

Tse-~, (pp.

-

63-70), I,
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National Congress of the CCp" of September 1928. 54 He stated that
all imperialist

countries ha.ve oontended for China;

as the

imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the oontradiction between the imperialist powers and the Whole Chinese
nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves
develop simultaneously in China, a daily intensifying strife thus
will ensue among the various oliques of the "reactionary rulers"
who have been supported by the imperialist powers.

Under this

phenomenon of contradictions the Chinese Communists should arouse
the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time.
At the same time the students and the workers in the oities must
be stimulated to widen strikes and demonstrations against imperial
ists.

The Red Army heneeforth would be expanded, and the revolu-

tionary upsurge would arise very soon. 55
other Theorists

~

China

Important to the Chinese Communist theory on anti-imperialism
are the opinions of the leaders of Moscow.

For convenience we

aummarize with selected words of Trotsky an stalin in the following paragraphs.

54The

text of tlpolitioal Resolution of the Sixth National

~ngreSB of the CO lpl" (September 1928) is quoted
hwartz,
CUtnentar Histori.2! Chinese Connnunism, pp. ~ lSJ'9:;JW€,,~

!

55Mao , ttA Single Spark Can Start a Pr Me FimtPo(.-rit~ in

~uary 1930),

c;.v-l2l.

Selected Works of Mao Tse--

,

(pPllv~M\28),

,

-Trootsky:

T~otsky

semi-colonial country.

in 1927 stated that "China is an oppressed
'The development 01: the productive 1:orce8

of China • • • demands the shaking o1:r at the imperialist yoke_ n 56
In another work of the same year Trotsky insisted: " Imperialiam,
which Violently haapers the economic development of China by its
customs, its financial and military policy, condemns the workers
to beggary and the peasants to the cruelest enslavement."

The

proessure of foreign-imperialism, as Trotsky regaroded it, is in no
sense an external and meChanical pressure which welds all the
classes together.

Thus he states, "The Chinese commercial and

industrial bourgeoisie carries behind it the supplementary foroce
of foreIgn capital and foreign bayonets in everoy one of its serioul
collisions with the proletariat. rt 57

Therefore. he went on, flif

one wants to drive out foreign-imperialism • • • then his [the

1mperlnltst's] ;.>eacetul, normal hangman's and robber's work in
China must be rendered impossible."

The Victory over foreign-

imperiAlism" can only be won by the means of the toilers of town

land country driving It out of ChIna. n58 Since Chiang Kai ... 3hek's
lUo Min Tang at that time had begun to discover the Communist
~on8piracy,

it had been regarded by Trotsky as "an instrument ot

56T~otsky. p. 26.

57 Ibid., p. 116.
58_a,
Ibid

p.

117 •
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compradors and imperialism," "the center of conspiracy,ft and fta
dictatorship of the bourgeois counter-revolution. n59
Stalin:

Chinese intellectuals found the words of Stalin on

the Chinese question more attractive than those of Trotsky.
On November

24,

1918.

3tali~

stated: "The foreign imperialist

look upon the Orient as the source of their fortune because there
i8 natural wealth •

• • • The imperialists not only want the

natural wealth, but also want the honest people of the colony and
semi-colony • • • who would be exploited by the imperialists to
tight against themselves within their own nation. n60

In his report made betore the Fourteenth Plenun of the Party,
December 18, 1925, stalin asserted that the Chinese Revolution is
tor truth and justice; it is aimed at the emancipation 01' the
Chinese people trom the imperialists and at the unity of China.
Anyone who overlooks the oharacter of Chinese Revolution will
arrive at failure.61
On Uovember 30, 19?6, he asserted: "The foreign-imperialist
power in China is not only political but also economical.

The

Chinese railways, mines, factories, and banks all are under the

59~., pp. 28, 36, 45.
60JOsePh stalin, Lan C~~g Kuo Ko Min, win~ Ti (on the
~.stions of Chinese Revolu on);-irans. s no-RusSTan:Friendship
.llociation; (p.king,~949), pp. 36-37.

~__6_l_Ib_i_d_._'_P_._L_~___4_2.________________________________~

--foreign-imperialist control. n62
While he instructed the CCP to build up the Red Army he
opposed the Communist withdrawal from the Kuo Min Tang,63 because
he realized it would be impossible to control Chiang Kai-Shek
directly.

In a speech of April

5,

1927 he said "At the present

time we need the'Right" (the ftRight" Kuo Min Tang).64

However a

short period later, he sharply criticized Chiang and insisted that
the COP must withdraw from the Right.

He realized there was

danger for the CCP in the coalition government since Chiangts
hostility against the CCP was becoming fiercer.
In his speech of November 30, 1926, we find Stalin ir!sisting
that city riots must be the first phase ot the efforts to destroy
foreign imperialists in China, while to arm peasants must be the
••cond. 65

But on May 13, 1927, in addressing Chinese students in

Moscow 3talln err.?hasized that it was time to teach the poor peasan If
and to arm them, so that t~ey might be an important part of the

liberation of China from imperialism. 66
The effect of the above statements of the Communists on the

62Ibid., p.

45.

63Ibid., pp. 53, 54, 58.
64I98.aO, p. 185.
65stalin, p. 69.

66 Ibid., pp. 119, 121.

~------------
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Chinese intellectual circles, can be seen in the statement of a
Chinese author,

~oae

words read: "Bolshevism in China • • • may

defy the predatoriness of foreign-imperialism • • • •

This is the

kind of Bolshevism that appeals to the most sensitized and the
most articulate elements of the nation, the nationalists and the
intelligentsia. "67
Attacks

~

General Attack.

Foreisners under Communist Influence
During the early period of the Revolution

Chen Tu-Hsiu was the head.of the Literature Department of the
University of Peking, and Li Ta-Chao professor of history at the
same university.

Because of their intellectual eminence Chen and

Li had great influence on the students in the educational oenters.
Religion being the opium.of the people, according to MarxismLeninism, the "foreign religion" became the first target of the
attackers.

In fact, during the early period of the Republio the

conservative idea was as strong as before.

The general attitude

was that China had its own superior moral teachings of Confucius
and did not need the ~heretic" religion from the west. 68

This

general attitude made easy the Communist movement against the
Church.

The slogans for anti-religion at tho beginning were

61 Ken Shah-Wei, Russo-Chinese Diplomacl, (Shanghai, 1928),

P. 325.

68Kiang 'Nen-Han, p. 53.
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ItHeligious faith is anti-knowledge n or "religion is the opiate of
people,1t

A proolamation sent out by the Anti-Christian Student

Federation in Maroh, 1922 read: "Christianity and the Christian
Churoh have oreated many evils in the history of mankind • • • •
The present Christianity and Church are the evils that support the
property-holding class to exploit and oppress the non-property
holding cla8s."69

But such attacks, however, as Chapman said,

had less effect than attacks which said that Christianity was a
"foreign religion," managed and subsidized by foreigners, an
imperialistic system elaborately organized with its literature,
its churohes, sohools, and hospitals, tor the purpose of dominating and enslaving the Chinese people.70

The missionaries, ot

course, were reviled as "spies of imperialistslf and "oapitalist
torces n and accused 01' catching the young lite of Chins. for their
own imperialistic purposeJ the Chinese Christians were accused as
"the running dogs of the imperialists,ft or "you submit yourselves
to the imperialists and capital~sts who are exploiting you. n71
Hughes, as a witness in China during the early days, saw that the
Communist propaganda at that time was making advances in stUdent

-

-

69Quoted in ibid., p. 62.

70H• Owen Chapman,
1928), pp. 172-173.

:.......'

~

!h! Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927, (London

71Quoted in E. R. Hughes, The Invassion of China
-!stern World, (London, 1937), PP7 95, 192. --

"

~

the
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circles in the North and was destined soon to be legitimized in
the South; the intelligentsia were entirely conversant with
c~~unist agitations. 72

Other early experts on China witnessed

the same thing. 73
There was another prevalent feeling regarding the foreigners.
A Chinese student, in the Weekly

Revie~

of November 1, 1924, made

a declaration: "The prevalent feeling in China has been that
foreigners as such are superior to the Chinese; it is this feel
which sets China to be a pupil of the Nest.

The result is

material improvement, but spiritual degeneration.

Man in China

begins to lose his self-respect, becomes a mere imitator. n7 4

The

ltudent went on that the Chinese must attack those foreigners who
had a " superior air" and niooked down upon all Chinese. n'7!)
Plychologically speaking, self-belittling plays a role of resent•• nt.

Since the foreign missionaries made up a large percentage

ot the westerners in China, Chinese resentment became fixed on
72 Ibid., p. 95 •

-

73a. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall, An ~lt1ine History of China,
(lew York, 1926), p. 422; Chapman, pp. 73, 171-173; Macartney
and others, Survey of International Affairs, for ~, II (London,
1928), 320, 322; Arnold J. Toynbee, surve~ of-r:nternational
Affairs, ~ 1926, (London, 1928), 283-28 .-74Quoted in Gowen and Hall, pp. 422-423.
75Ibld., p. 423.

..

the missionaries as a consequence.

The resentment burst out into

violent riots against missionaries.
Outrage against Christianity.

History shows that the flame

of vilblent riots against Christianity came to peak intensity from

1924 to 1927. A few cases will be illustrative.
In May 1924 some American priests were arrested, and two
other missionaries were killed at Kweilin. 76

In December a group

of Catholic priests and nuns were captured near Hankow. 71

1925, two missionaries were captured at Linchow. 78

In May

In February

1926 an American mission at Kashek, on the Island of Hainan, was
destroyed by students and soldiers. 79 In the same place, a Frencll
orphanage was similarly attacked a year later. 80 In March 1926,
the Canton Hospital, an American philanthropic institut4on, was
compelled to close, because the Communist Worker's Union caused
the Chinese staff to seize control of the orphanage by cutting off
water, electricity, and tood supplies. 81

The same thing happened

to the Canton Christian College and the Anglo-Chinese College at

71~.~ n6cember 8, 1924, p. 1.

76The New York Times, May 2, 1924,

-

78 Ibid., May 3. 1925,

p.

p.

26., May 27, 1924,

28., May 7, 1925,

p.

p.

6

9.

19TOynbee, pp. 338-339-

~.

I

80 The Times (London), Be~ary 18, 1927, p. 14.

--

81~.,

March 11, 1926, p. 11; March 15, 1926, p. 13 •
..
L....
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - -

swatow. 82

At ~Vuchow, the Amerioan mission station and schools

were closed and the missionaries were expelled because the Chinese
did not want the white people to "degrade" the young Chinese. 8 3
At Chengtu a Canadian woman missionary was murdered in the street
on the seventh of June. 8 4

There was anti-Christian riot at

Nanchowting in Hunan, in which the property of the mission was
damaged. 8S

At Changsha, there was a riot against the America

Mission College; the student Union under Communist agitation
demanded the control of the administration from American hands. 86
In January, 1927, an outrage against the Spanish mission at Fuchow
occurred.

The story was spread that the mission orphanage was

maintained to procure children whose eyes and other organs would
be removed to make drugs.

The agitators throughout several pro-

vinces were using tales of this kind to excite the populace
against foreign missionaries. 87

On April 1, 1927, three mis&ons

were looted at Kweillng, and widespread anti.Christian riots

82Ibid., March 19, 19?6, p. 131 March 29, 1926, p. 14.

83~., April 6, 1926, p. 10.
84Ib1d ., June 22, 1926, pr 16, June 28, 1926, p. 14.
85Ibid., November 22, 1926, p. 14.
86 The New York Times, December 17, 1926, p. 7; The Times
(Londonr;-January i9, 1~~7, p. 13.
---
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Times, January 18, 1927, p.

4,
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happened in Chunking. 88

Two days later two churches and the Mahan

school were seized by students and soldiers at Shanghai. 89
Concerning the systematic violent attacka on foreign missionaries

some~ritish

observers in December 1926 reported that

communist agents were furiously trying to bolshevize the Chinese
people and to promote the Chinese nationalist sentiment against
foreigners by gDoss misrepresentation.9 0
Also, an American ofticial, atter three months in China,
reported in July 1927 that in the previous years attacks against
missionaries and foreigners were due to Red intluence. 91
Riots as.inst Foreigb Factories

~

Concessions.

labor problems have provided stimulation to the

As we know

Co~nunist

movement

The Chinese laborers, as the other Chinese people, had the traditional anti-toreign attitude, and also as the Communlts stated,
they realized that they were under the oppression of foreignimperialists and capitalists because ot their direct contact with
the foreigners. 92

After the First Congress of CCP on July 1, 1921

labor unions were organized by the Communist leaders in many

88 Ib1d., April 1, 1927, p. 1.

-

89Ibid., April,), 1927, p. 3.

90~., December 17, 1926, p. 7.

S4
<,

91~., July). 1927, Section 1, p. 6.
92Hu Bua, Chung Kuo Hain Min Chu Chu I Ko MinS Shih, pp. 29.

J also see

tootnote~.-

-

-

-

- -

-
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cities. 93

In tl~ Second Congress of' the CCP, July 1922, a deci-

sion to exploit laborers in the right against foreign-imperialism
was put on record. 9 4
On the other hand, the concessions. which allowed foreigners
to have their own troops, post offices and courts in the extraterritories, were considered as a great humiliation to the Chines
people.

Communist policy decided that the masses must attack the

foreign extraterritories without previous diplomatic negotiation.
Thereupon a tlNew Boxerts Spirit" arose stronger than the spirit
whieh prompted the riot of 1900.
The year 1922 brought the strike of Chinese seamen in Hong
Kong.

~~is

lasted two months.

The men asked tor a large incr

in their scale of wages, but it was soon observed that agitators"
aoting for political motives, were back ~f it.95

This strike has

been called the first vie tory for Chinese labor on the part of
Chinese Communists.96

The year 1923 saw .fifty-one labor disputes

in Shanghai, but they were Rot so serious as the strike of the
previous year.

For some reason the activities of Bolsheviks and

their agitators had been less vigorous during 1923. 97

-

93Hu Hua, pp. 27, 29.
94;Cbid., p.

41.

95Macartney and others, II, 318-320.

96Hu Hua, pp. 29-31.
91M
and others

•

Fram July
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15 to August 19, 1921... in Oanton a general strike took place, the
basis o£ wnich was clearly political.

On June 19, 1924, a bombing

attempt was made in the British concession at Oanton against the
governor o£ French Indo-Ohina, and there were numerous European
casualities.

The authorities ot the concession theretore insti-

tuted regulations tor the control ot the Ohinese in the concession
These regulations were resented by the Chinese, and a general and
violent strike ensued led by Communist agitators.9 8
In 1925, the so called "WU San Tsen An" or the "Incident of
30th ot May" oocurred.

Originally forty Chinese employees of a

Japanese mill at Shanghai

we~e

dismissed on February 4, 1925.

a consequence 313,000 Chinese workers were made idle.

As

Machinery

was destroyed, the manager was killed, and some other Japanese
employers wounded.

on May 14 because two Ohinese foremen in a

Japanese factory were dismissed again, the Chinese workers destroy
ed machinery again, and some Chinese were wounded by Japanese fire

About five thousand students paraded the main streets of the Inter
national Settlement, distributing anti.imperialist pamphlets and
-&king speeches.

The students called tor united action against

the capitalist and imperialist states of France, America, Great
Brltaih, and

Jap~n.

In the following tew days there were

~

I

98Ibid., 321; also The Times (London),July 17, 1924, p. 13;
Ul1 23~2~, p. 13; Jury-)l, lQz4. p. 11.
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continuous outbreaks and attacks on foreigners. 99

This general

riot was led by Li Li-San, the Communist Chairman of All Labor
Federation, and another Communist, Liu Rua. lOO Moscow revealed
that the Comintern aided the general outUreak with 30,000 rubles!O
Not only the Chinese Communists admitted tta t they had incited
this disturbance; at the same time foreign reporters at the scene
saw much evidences of the Communist agitation.

An interesting

feature of the trial of the students arrested in connection with
the riot was the production by the prosecution of a mass of
Bolshevist literature discovered in many college8. l02
Another milestone in the history of Chinese Communist agitation against toreigners is the attack on the British concession at
Hankow on January 3, 1927.

This attack was led by Liu Shao-Chi,

the discipliner of the CCP, and former vice-president of Red
Government ot Peking.

Since the Chinese people at that time

resented the British who had tired upon the Chinese on the
oooasion of the Communist celebration ot their anti-imperialist

99Marcartney and others, 381-382.
100Hu Hua, pp. 62, 63.
101
!h! ~ ~ Times, June

4,

1925, p. 12.

102The Times (London), June 10, 1925, p. 14; for further
show the Communist agitation in the riot of 30th May
'" ~bi~., June 1, p. 10; June 2; p. 12; June 3, p. 12; June 4,
• 1,; une 6, p. 12; June 8, p. 14.

'Yldence~
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Labor Union,lO) the police could not control the mm.
swarmed into the British concession.
concession were chased.

The mob

The foreign residents of the

A Westerner walking in the street was no

longer safe from stone throwing.

The yell of the mob was "Kill

the foreign dog.l ff And on January 6, the British flag was hauled
down. 104 Comment in the New York Times stated that the seeds of
_ _

........;",;0.;;....

hate sown two years before by the Communist agents had grown
copiously. 105
The American consulate at Chunking was subjected to a similar
catastrophe.

On March 31 of the same year, the American Consulate

was stoned and the consul was forced to flee to a warship.

The

American flag was also torn down.

The accusation was "AmerlcanBritain imperialist cooperation against China. nl06 The Communist
operation behind the scene was evident as interpreted by the
American reporters. 10 7
All these outrages against foreigners cited above were hailed
in August 1927, by the Chinese Communist Party as rtthe glorious

84, 85.
~j
l04The New .!.2!:! Times, January Ij., 1927, p. 27; January 5,
~927, P.-rj 3anuary 6, 1927, p. 1.
10)Hu Hua, pp.

l05~., editorial, January 5, 1927, p. 20.
lo6~., April 1, 1927, p. 1.
l07~., April 16, 1927, p. 2; April 17, 1927, P. 9.
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page of history of the Chinese Communist movement. tl108
In viewing the description given in this chapter, we might
conclude that during the beginning of the Chinese revolution
Communism was concordant with the Chinese new nationalist spirit,
and that the various attacks operated by the
rather the outlet for this spirit.

But

8.

Co~~nlsts

were

revolutionary chaos

always provides the opportunity for the development of Communism,
particularly so in anti-foreign China.
l08nCircular Letter ot the CC rOOp] to All Party Members"
(August 7, 1921), cited in Schwartz, ! Documentar,l History 2!.
Chinese Communism, p. 103.

~---------

CHAPTER III
"UNI'rED FRONT" AGAINST .JAPAN

(1931-1945)
The traditionally ethnocentric attitude of the Chinese toward
the Japanese has been mentione4 in the first chapter.
interpretation must be added here.
"small Japanese."

Now some

The Chinese call the Japanese

A Chinese designated by the nickname, "small

Japanese," would deeply resent it.

A Chinese who has a round face

and short body.would have his countrymen say,"Re looks like a
Japanese I "

If a Chinese girl has bowed legs the young boys might

say that no one would want to marry her because her legs are like
those of a Japanese woman.
Schools have helped to foster hatred of the Japanese, since
students are taught the history of Japanese aggression against
China.

"The small Japanese have forgotten their ancestors, their
•
parents," is not merely a saying used by the common people, but is
to'be heard in speeches made by offiCials before the public.

The

ohildren in China like to playa Chinese-Japanese battle game:
one group plays the role of the Japanese; the other, of the ChineSE
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sticks are their guns and stones are their hand-grenades.

Such

games are in vogue even among college studBnts. 1
The peasants in the rural areas did not know ot British,
French, and American "imperialism" until they were taught about it
by the Chinese Communists.

However, the term "Japanese imperial ...

iam" was well known to them.
not, like to 11se the

ri::~ht

The peasants did not, and still do

appe11ation---Japanese; inste9.d of this

"Japanese devil," or "devil" is customarily used.

,~hen

the

Communists moved into the country and began to prepare the uneducated peasantry to fight the Japanese, they found a hatred of the
Japanese already established.
~

Sino-Japanese Conflicts after

!2J!

The Chinese people, still remembering Japanese hostilities
against China in the past, were subjected again to
summer of 1931.

agp~ession

in

On July 2, 1931, as the result of a dispute

between Chinese and Korean farmers in Wanpaoshan, Kilin Province,
12" Chinese inhabi tants were killed and 393 Chinese were woUnded
by Japanese and Koreans in Seoul, Korea. 2

Following this incident

the Japanese began an invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931.

IFor college students playing the battle game in early days
see Agnes Smedly, Battle ~ of China, (New York, 1943), p. 109.
2Arnold J. To~bee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931
(London. 1932), p. 434.
. --
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In the following few months Japan sent her troops deep into
Manohuria and bombarded many cities.

On February 16, 1932, a

puppet regime of Manohuria was set up, and on January 28 and 29,
1932, Japanese forces attacked the Chapei district of Shanghai.
Japanese warShips bombarded Nanking on the 2nd of February, and
the Chinese Government was forced to withdraw to Loyang, Honan
Province.

On January 3, 1933, Japanese forces bombarded and

occupied 3hanhaikwan.

Ignoring the League Committee of Nineteen,

which had met for discussion of the Sino-Japanese conflict,
Japanese troops advanoed into Jehol Province on the 24th of
February, and by Maroh 5th; launohed an invasion across the Great
Liall,: ,1n inner M01Jlgolia.' By March 30th, Japanese troops entered
Chahar Province.

During April and May they rushed on south of the

Great Wall and occupied the Luan River district and threatened
Peiping and Tientsin.

On May 31st, the Chinese Government was

forced to sign the Tangku Agreement, by which Chinese troops
evacuated Tangku, and Chinese Government promised to cease hostiIi ties against Japan.;

On November 15, 1935. the Japanese made an

attempt to enlarge the "autonomous" puppet state of Yin Ju-Keng in
the eastern part of Hopei Province.

In December they conducted

air and army campaigns to force the Chinese Government to recogniz

3The Tangku Agreement is re.ferred to by Westel W. Wi 1 loyghby,
Sino-Japanese Controversy ~ ~ ~eagu6 £! Nation!. (Baltimore, 1935). pp. 501-~08.
.

~
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the "Autonomy of North China," and. on December 15th, the ItAutonomous Political Council for HopEli and Chahar" was formally
inaugurated.

On January 18, 1936, Japanese again set up an "Auto-

nomy of Inner Mongolia," which was allied to the Manchuria Puppet
state.

From January to Nobember of the same year the Japanese

with their puppet troops made sporadic attacks in North China.
The anti-Japanese movement gained great momentum. in China as a
consequence.
Anti-Japan~

!!?vement

When the news of the WaI}paoshan and Mukden incidents reached
Shanghai, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai decided to
lead a nation wide anti-Japanese boycott.

On November 24, 1931,

thirty-five thousand workers were called out at the Japanese port
area in Shanghai.

By the beginning of December about 800,000

workers struck in protest against Japanese aggreasion.4

During

the same period in Yunnan the anti-Japanese movement forced twenty
five Japanese residents to leave.

On OctOber 10, 1931, at Canton

Chinese refused to sell goods to the Japanese

~nd

waged a general

boycott on the loading and unload1r1g of Japanese ships.

During

the same period simultaneous outbreaks of the same character
happened at Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Wenchow, Hanchow, Q..nd in North
IPrhe number of workers is given in Hu Eua, Chung ~ ~
! !2. rUng .§h!.h, p. 153.

~ ~

.M!.!!
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China.

FDr example, on September 28, 1931, fifteen Japanese resi-

dents at Chenghow found it advisable to leave.

At Tientsin

violent attacks on Japanese were made on November 8, 1931.5
During the following years the murder ot Japanese in the cities
became quite common.

6

It is difficult to determine what role the Communists played
in thoae outbreaks.

However, Mao Tse-Tung has asserted that the

Communists supported any anti-Japanese movement, particularly,
aiding the Shanghai boycott with a great deal ot money.1
communist writers boasted that many cases of anti-Japanese outbreaks were promoted and led by CoMmunists. 8
The Chinese stUdents also plunged into aetion to demand a
united tront against Japan.

On September 28, 1931, a host of

.tudents stormed the Ministry ot Foreign Affairs at Nanking ana
1nflicted physioal

~njuries

upon the Foreign Minister C. T. Wang

on account ot his lack ot success in his negotiations with the

5fhe summary o~ the anti-Japanese movement in various cities
18 referred to Toynbee, Survez of International Affairs, ~ ~,
PP.

4.63-465.

-

6For details of murder eases see ibid., PP. 468-470; also
for 1932, p. 514: also ibid., for-I936, PP. 2oi, 911, 917.
, 920-921.
----

Ired.,

7Mao Tse-Tung, "Report ot the President or the Central
ixecutive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic," Yakhontoft,
~2~~nese Soviets, (New York, 1934), (Appendices, PP. 249-283),

.....

8
Hu Hua, p. 1.53 •
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League of Nations. 9

Late in November, 1931, about fifty thousand

students, including many from Shanghai and Hangchow, gathered in
the capital, Nanking, to petition the Government to drive out the
Japanese.

The students refused to withdraw until Chiang Kai-Shek

addressed them personally.10

On December 9 other bands of stu

stormed and captured the municipal ottice ot Shanghai, cowed the
municipal authorities, defied the police and disarmed the officer
Finally they wrecked the local headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang.
On December 15, about eighty thousand students from di.ffe1"ent
cities converged upon llanking and for the second time wrecked the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attacked ;he Central Headquarters
ot

~uo

Min Tang.

Several top officials were physioally attacked.

The students transferred their resentment against Japan to
their own government primarily becaUse the government tried to
avoid a
lations.

m~litary

conflict with Japan by appealing to the League

This governmental policy worked to the advantage of the

Communists.

A Chinese writer at that time stated that Communist

influence was growing among the students who partioipated in
Communist demonstrations in large cities) that in at least some

-

9'l'oynbee, Survey!! International Affairs, !2::.~, p.

414.

lOKia~ Wen-Han, The 9h1nese Student MOVement, p. 103.
IlToynbee, Survez 9.! Internatim a1 Affairs,
12Ib1d •

!2£!2.J.!, p. 415.

54
of the student strikes in various cities there was a directing
hand of the Communist party.1)

This writer also pointed out that

in spite of the Kuo Min Tang.s suppression of Communism. Communis
literature still was secretly distributed: "One would, for exampl
come across a book with a cover entitled tpaul, the Friend of
Youth' publisheg by the 'Christian Literature Siciety, Shanghai,
1930' sud would be surprised to fInd on the first page that it
really the Communist International Monthll.

Or one would be

attracted by the title of a popular novel on another book cover
and find propaganda in the form ot folk song • • • • tl14
Moreover, the Oommu~ t books and the works ot left-wing
writers constituted a great percentage of books read during that
period. 15 It is reasonable to say that the students. outbreaks
were definitely influenced by Communist propaganda.
On December 9. 1935, students burst out again in protest
against Japan's forcible demand ot separation ot North China.
Students trom nearly all colleges and schools in Peiping took
in the demonstration. 16 Minor clashes. occurred between the polic

l3wu Yao-Tsung, "Movement Among Chinese Students," China
12J!, edt Frank Rawlinson, (Shanghai, 1931),

~lstlan Yearbook,

PP. 259-274), p. 262.

-

l4Ibid.

15~., p. 265.
16!h! !!! ~ Times, December 10, 1935, sect. 1, p. 14.
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and students.

A number of students were beaten with clubs or

wounded by swords of the police while the writer was at the scene.
Another city wide stUdent demonstration was launohed in Peiping on
December 16, 1935.
the parade.

About seven thousand students participated in

Their slogans were. "Down with Northern Militarists'"

"Down with Japanese Imperialism'"

"China for the Chinese'"

police tried to stop them with firehoses and clubs.

The

The students

cried "Chinese police, do not fight Chinese students'" and
"Chinese, arise to save Chinal"

as the writer heard at that time~

Subsequently, a series ot student demonstrations took place in
Nanking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Kaiteng, Hanko. and other cities. 18
The peiping Student Union worked out a synopsis of its
program tor the use ot its propaganda teams, revealing something

ot the Communist role in the student demonstrations.

The synopsis

asserted that China, being a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country
could only have a future by struggling against imperialiSM and
teudaliSM, but that just then the paramount task was to deteat
Japanese imperialism; that the policy ot appeasement ot the Kuo
Min Tang was causing more conoeBn than the invasion ot the enemy,

-

l7 Ibid., Dec·ember 11, 1935. Sect. 1, p. 18., for details see
Hubert F'reyn, .;:,.P-;;.,re;;,; l; ,; u; .; d;, ; .e !.2.Y!!!:,,, (Shanghai, 1939)" Chapter III.

l8The New York Times, December 18, 1935, sect. 1, p. 1.
1, p. 16; December 20, 1935, sect. 1,
~
. . . !. 11, December 21, 1935, sect. 1, p. 1. December 22, 1935,
. • ~.ct. 1, p. 21, December 24, 1935, sect. 1. p. 9.
Deoember-r9;-r9~seot.

56
and hence there should be a united opposition against civil war;
that China could not be isolqted from the rest of world; and that
the Chinese problem was only a part of the world problem, so that
China must join hands with the other oppressed races and nations
in a common struggle} and that for national emancipation the
students could not do the fighting alone but must promote a "unitee
front" with the masses of the people. 19
This synopsis led the Nanking Government to condemn the
Communist influence behind the student movement. 20 An expert on
the Chinese Communist movement said that Communists took advantage
of the stUdent "patriotic" demonstrations and that many of the
leading demonstrators later became COlmnunist officials. 21

An ex·

Communist who had worked with the Chinese Communist Party for
eighteen years indicated that Communists had played an important
role within the student anti-Japanese movement, and that student
resentment against Japan was transferred to

the Nanking Governmen

at the Communist Party's instructiona. 22
On March 28, 1936, a Chinese Student Union was inaugurated at
Shanghai.

-

It claimed to represent two hundred thousand students

19cited in Kiang Wen.Han, pp. 106-107.

--_ _

20The New York .......
Times,
.... December 1"1, 1935. sect. 1, p. 18.
21Hu Tsiou-Yuan. "Preface" for Szu Ma-Lu, TOW-Chien Shih Pa
Years Struggle), (Hong Kong, 1952), pp. j-~.--

t 1en (Eighteen

22Sz. Ms.-Lu, pp. 17-22.
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of universities and middle schools.

In its "Call to the Nation"

it said that this organization had aimed to establish a national
anti-Japanese united front to stnuggle for the existence ot ChinesE
nation. 23

This was in keeping with the Communist propaganda---

"United Front against Japan,1t which w111 be dealt with later.

The policy of the Kuo Min Tang toward any foreign country was
made olear in a declaration issued as early as January 22, 1927,
by Eugen Chen on behalf of the National Government at WUhan.

This

declaration made it olear that the Kuo Min Tang would not use
armed conflict with toreign nations, even Japan, to sotve the
internatIonal problems.

It 'InsIsted that all unsolved problems

between National Revolutionary ChIna and foreign powers should be
regulated by negotIation and agreement. 24
Although Japan committed unprecedented aggressions against
China, ChIang Kai-Shek still endeavored to avoid armed conflict
with Japan.

Chiang tried through the League ot Nations to restrail

Japanese aggressions, at least temporarily.

The opponents of

Chiang cr1 tic1zed his policy as "non-resistance. tI

Actually, Chianl

23!h! Voice of China, I, No.3 (April 15, 1936), 8, quoted in
liang Wen-Ran, p.-ro7.

24The

text of the manifesto issued by Chen quoted in Tang

~L_a_n_g_-_L_l___Th_e_Inn_8_r_H_l_s_t_o_r_I_9_.!_t_h_e_C_h_i_n_e_s_8_R_e_v_o_lu_ti_o_n_,_p_il_3_3_6_._ _...
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saw that Japan was strong, while China was weak; that defeat would
be inevitable it China got involved in a large-seale war with
Japan.

Knowing this, the Japane.e then made every effort to find

a pretext tor immediate war with China, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordere
Chang Haueh-Liang, the governor ot Manchuria, to retreat trom
Manehuria without a fight.

He also issued an order to Tsai Ting-

Ke, the commander of Nineteenth Rout.
against the Japanese at Shanghai.

A~y,

to cease reilstance

Before World War II Chiang Kai-

Shek always insisted that China could not right nan unprepared war
with Japan."

China must bide its time. Chiang believed.

The

popular assertion of Chiang Kai-Shek was that "we shall not
peace until there is no hope for peace.

forsa~

We shall not talk lightly

of .acrifiee until we are driven to the last extremity which makes
sacririce inevltable. n25
The Chinese traditional policy was:

first, pacification with.

in the nation, and. then resistance to :foreign aggression.

The

Kuo Min Tang Government believed that the :first task or resistance
against Japan should be to unify China, sinee there was the existence of provincialists and the opposition of the Communists.
~Vhile

Chiang Kai-Shek was using persuasive tactics to win control

of the warlords, he was using the armed forces in five campaigns

25 The statement was made at the Fifth National Congress of tht

Kuo Min Tang in November, 1935. The English quotation quoted in
T. A. Bisson, Japan.!!l China. (New York, 1938), p. 93.
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against Communists between the end ot 1930 to autumn of 1934. 26
After the fifth campaign the Chinese Communists were forced to
move through the country, from south to northwest China.
In the cities, the Kuo Min Tang followed a policy of suppress
ing the anti-Japanese movement.

From 1931 to 1937 the most common

problem was opposition to the Kuo Min Tangls policy of nOnPesistance to Japanese encroachments.

Against the anti-Japanese

move~

ment the Kuo Min Tangts secret police, or "Blue Shirts,1t were lIept
busy arresting and killing the demonstrators and the Red agitators
For instance, in 1931 a collection of reports from only six
provinces produced a total ot 39, 778 executions. 27

This was the

"White Terror,tt so called by the Chinese Communists and some
foreign reporters. 28
Under the unceasing Japanese pressure the Kuo Min Tang was
compelled to make its policy clearer than before.

On June 10,

1935, it promulgated a "Goodwill Mandate" which said that uAll
citizens should observe the proper amenities towards rriendly

26Accordlng to the Kuo Min Tang there was four campaigns, but
the Chinese Communists count five. The difference is due to the
period of June to September, 1931, which the Communists divided
Into two periods.
27The figure is given in Isaac, The Tragedz of the Chinese
296. According to IsaacTs interpretatIon, thIs
~lgure Is not very accurate, but not seriously exaggerated.

~Volutlon, p.

~

11 28Por .. discussion or the "White Terror" aee Smedley, PP" 104
~_2_1_.__sm_e_d_l_e_y_ha
__
S_b_e_en
__a_s_ym:_p_a_th_i_z_er
__
W_l_th
__the
__C_h_in_e_s_e_c_omm_,
_ll_U_l_s_t_S_......
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natlons;1I and that "no organizat1ons whatsoever can be formed
_hleh might be detrimental to intern_tional relations."29

Later,

on February 19. 1936, an emergency law was issued authoriz1ng the
troOPS or po11ce to "use force or other effect1ve measures to
IUPpress all 'patriQtic' meet1ngs and demonstrations."3 0

However,

the Kuo Min Tang were not traitors; they made use of the antiJapanese tendenoy to inject anti-Japanese spirit and

disci~line

Into the p1ck of the1r arm¥; the teachers in the schools retained

the materials concerning Japanese aggressive history.

But the

ICuo Min Tang felt that the people had to be kept quiet in order to
prevent Communist expl01tation and to deprive the Japanese of a
pretext for further aggression •

.'!:h!

Communist Appeal

!2.

Resistance against Japan

BeCause the Kuo Min Tang did not resist Japanese aggression
in Manchuria, it left itself open to a psyohological attack by the
Communists.

On

April 26, 1932, a telegram of "Declarat1on ~ar

Against Japan" was issued by the "Soviet Republic of China."31
The heart of this declaration is as follows:

29Quoted in Bisson, Japan ~ China, p.

58.

-

30The English translation quoted in Hubert Feryn, Prelude to
War, pp. 65-66.

-

31 The text of "Declaration War against Japan" is in Yakhontof
~ L!h~ Chin••• Soviets, (Appendioes), pp. 236-238.

;
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The counter-revolutionary Kuo MIn Tang Government
and the militarists ot all cliques following their general practice ot capitulation to imperiali~. surrendered
Manchuria, Shanghai, Woosung • • • to Japanese imperialism, leaving unchecked the slaughter ot Chinese people.
At present, the Kuo Min Tang, under the pretext ot negotiating tor peace, is selling the whole of China. It
is exerting the utmost effort to haoten the imperialist
partition of China. To demonstrate its loyalty to imperialism, the Kuo Min Tang with the all means at its
disposal suppresses the nation wide anti-Japanese • • •
movement, all anti-Japanese o~ganization} breaks all
anti-Japanese strikes ot the workers, shoots down the
anti-Japanese masses • • •• The so-called "prolonged
resistance," the so-called "negotiate peace while offering resistance" ot the Kuo Min Tang • • • ar& in ~eality
nothlng but phrases concocted to tool the masses. J2
This declaration also insisted that the "government ot the
Soviet Republic ot China" would unite and lead the workers, peasants, students and other groups, and the Red Army to engage in
the national "revolutionary war" to q.rive the Japanese out ot Chint
to oppose the "imperialist pari;ition" of China. However, the first
step tor driving imperialism out of China, the declaration asserted, must be the overthrow ot the Kuo Min Tang regime.

Only in

this way, as it was pointed out, could the Communists directly and
unhinderedly fight against the Japanese lmperialists. 33
On April 15, 1933, under the names of Mao Tse-Tung$ Chu Teh,
and Chang KUo Tao, another declaration was issued • .34

'11}}is mes,9age

32 Ibid., p. 236.

33Ibid., p.

237.
34The text of this declaration originally appeared in China
Forum (May

12U.

4,

1933), quoted in Yakhontoff, (Appendices), pp. 238-

is a repetition of the Deolaration of War against Japan.
conolusion emphasized the appeal:

But its

tlWe appeal to all toilers and

soldiers to work tor the aooeptanoe of our national revolutionary
policy among the broad masses.

We appeal to the toiling masses

and soldiers to help us to defend China and the rights of its
people. tt35
On January 22, 1934, Mao Tse-Tung made a comprehensive report
to his party.36

In this report we

find two important aims:

to

urge on the anti-Japanese movement, and to arm and organize the
peasants and toiling classes.

Mao stated that the Kuo Min Tang

had sold many parts of China to the foreign
suppressed the anti-Japanese masses.

imperialists and

So the Soviet district, Mao

insisted, was the real anti-Japanese imperialist areal the Communists must continue to creat anti-Japanese volunteers and to
support the anti-Japanese movement in any part of China. 37
Tse-Tung the Japanese
sion against China.
American,

To Mao

imperialism was not isolated in its aggresHe declared that the fight against "British,

French, and Japanese

imperialists"

should be made

35Yakhontoft, p. 241.
36The report was made before the Second Soviet Congress held
at Chuchin, a small town ot Kiangsi Province and then the Red
Capital. The whole text originally appeared in the Chinese
Worker's corres ondenoe (an official news agency ot£ne Cap), IV,
No. 1;1. (Marcn j • 193~J, quoted in Yakhontofr, (Appendices),
pP. 249-283.

1

37Yakhontoff, pp. 252, 258, 282.

simultaneously, because he thought that "British, American, and
French imperialists" intended "to wreck the Chinese Soviet power
and to completely enslave the Chinese nation as a preliminary step
toward the war against the U.S.s.R. n 38
Mao Tse-Tung also instructed his Party:

"The historial task

of the Soviet is: to mobilize broad worker-peasant masses to join
the Red Army • • • to enlarge the local armed forces and partisans
to agitate for broad partisan wars • • • to develop the classstruggle • • • to promote the militanoe of the worker-peasant
masses. n39

Aocording to Mao, his aims were not only in line with

Marxist revolutionary theories, but were also made inevltable
because ot Japanese aggression and the Kuo Min Tang's attack upon
the Chinese Communists.
On July 15, 1936, a Communist controlled organization sent
out a message of appeal to all Chinese people to take united actio
against Japan.40

Mao Tse-Tung on August 10, 1936, made a public

and adroitly timed statement. 41

In replying to publio demands tor

a cessation of civil war and tor immediate action against Japan,

38...........
1bid., p. 251 •

...........

391bid., pp. 251, 259 •

4OFor the text ot the message of the communist controlled
organization, All China National Salvation Union, see Mao Tse-Tung
and others, China: The March Toward un1tl. (New York, 1937),
PP. 51-59.
---

41 The

text of Mao's statement is in ............
ibld., pp. 70-82 •

r

64Mao stated that the Chinese Communists after the events of September 18, 1931, were the first to offer their cooperation in the
struggle against Japan to all groups throughout the country.42

He

added that the Communist Party had no grounds whatever for giving
up their anti-Japanese
activities.4.3

policy or discontinuing

anti-Japanese

Mao went on, 1t-~'1e are ready to devote our entire

strength to this movement and to • • • engage in joint struggle together with all parties, groups, and people who do not want to become slaves, who want to fight against the destruction of China.,,41
It was a time when the situation was critical
nists because of the Long March.45

~or

the Commu-

Chiang Kai-Shek in August,

1936, declared that within three or five weeks he would destroy th~
Red Army completely.

Mao Tse-Tung, facing this critical moment,

appealed as follows:

"In view of the fact that the life of the

whole nation is almost on brink of total prostration, we have no
interest whatever in continuing a civil war in which Chinese fight

42Ibid., p. 71.

43ills!.t

p.

74.

44 Ibid ••

p. 77.

Ll-5 Long March is a. great event of the Chinese Communist histor~
From 1934 to 1936 the Red Army under the Kuo M:in Tang's suppressiol
were forced to carry out a general retreat. They walked through.
five provinces of Southwest China and finally arrived at northwest Shensi. This has been the so-called !lLong March" of the
Chi.nese ComMunis ts.

against Ch1nese • • ••

It the troops ot the Central Government

or other armed torees tight Japan and refrain trom suppressing the
s patriotic movement, we are ready to help them sincerely • •

• • "~
The policy ot Kuo Min Tang toward Japan, as ment10ned previously, was unit1eat1on ot China tirst and res1stance to Japan
second.

Mao Tse-Tung had this in m1nd when he said "The enemy has

already placed the Central and local governments ot China under
strict surveillance and is devouring one province atter another. n 4
And he continued:

"It should be clearly realized that to unite

China by armed torce means interm1nable civil war tor China • • •
We are not against paciflcation, but we qre opposed to c1vil war
traitors. "48
The Chinese wealthy classes and the Kuo Min Tang's otticers
the Communists in great tear lest their wealth and land would
conti seated by the Reds.

Mao, with this in mind, told them tha

Communist Party had changed its policy and that "the Communis
d not confiscate the land ot the rich peasants, it they come
tight aga1nst Japan," and that"the Communists
not confiscate the land ot anti-Japanese oft1cers."49

46Mao

Mao

Tse-Tung and others, Ch1na:!h! March toward Un1tz, p.72

47 Ib1d .,

p.

73.

48Ib1d., p. 80.
~
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finally emphasized that "the Communists are not hostile to those
people who take an anti-Japanese stand; ft 50 and that "our slogan
tor the united tront iSI

all parties and all classes; unite to

fight Japan and the traitors. rt51
The Chinese Communist Party, tollowing Mao Tse-Tung's appeal
of the tenth of August, addressed an open letter to the Kuo Min
Tang on August

25. 1936. 52 Realistically, this letter was not

aimed at the Ello Min Tang itselt, but at the intellectuals and the
general public.

The Chinese intellectuals talked about this lette

with great enthusiasm when it appeared in the newspapers.

This

open letter contained the same message as the declaration by Mao
two weeks previous.

To Communists, such repetition of their

appeal was advantageous because a general demand tor immediate war
against Japan arose trom the flAlI-China National SalVation Union."
And in addition, Chiang Kai-Shek having already pacified all the
provincial armies, was ooncentrating his troops to destroy the Red
army.

It was a time when the general confIdence in Chiang Kai.

Shek was on the increase.

The Communists wanted to bring the

people to distrust Chiang.
The open letter at tirst made a systematic recount of the

50 Ibid ., p. 76.

-

51 Ibid ., p. 78.
52The text ot the open letter is in ~., pp. 18-32 •

I

....
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aggressive activities ot Japan, and then stated:

"Japanese

imperialism w1ll never relinquish its robber plan ot enslaving
China until that plan is smashed to atoms at one determined blow
by all the torces ot China mobilized for battle.

The Changes in

the torm and direction ot the aggression of Japanese imperialism
• • • 1n no measure signify that Japanese imperialism intends to

cease its aggression, but are onl, an attempt to facilitate its
rapacious assault.

And anyone Who thinks he can assert that there

are any fresh hopes of peace • • • 115 only deceiving hlmselt."53
The letter emulated Chiang's policy---first unif1cation within the nation, then resistance to foreign aggression---by repeating that the Commun1sts always had desired to unite with any party
in the fight against Japan; and that if Chiang Kai-Shek would
accept the Communist Party as an equal political party in the national government. "the Red Army 115 prepared to subordinate itself
to the command of the united anti-Japanese army, and to fight on
any definite section of the front • • • and fulfill the fighting
tasks entrusted to it. tf54

To show how attractive was the Communis"

appeal we quote it at length:
There are two alternatives: to torm an anti-Communist front, i.e., a united tront to enslave the country,
together with Japanese imperialism and national traitors,
or a united anti-Japanese tront, a united tront to save

53Ibid., pp. 21-22.

-

54Ibid., p.

24.
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the country. together with the Communist Party of China
and the whole of our people. The moment has COlne for
the final choice. All hesitation and delay will lead
only to the ruin of the country and the people, and will
serve the purpose ot Japanese imperialism • • ••
IN.hen a united front has been set up between us and
you • • • we will have the right to cry aloud: "Let the
cowardly traitors and scoundrels cry out in the face of
Japanese imperialist viol~nce& tChina 1s not strong
enough to fight Japan.t"5~
The influence ot Communist propaganda should not be underestimated in judging the situation in China at that time.

One

example of the effect of Communist influence can be found in the
Sian Case, in whioh Ch1ang Kai-Shek was held as hostage by Chang
Haueh-Liang.
The details of the Sian uprising are still not fUlly known.
According to faots supplied from dIfferent Chinese and foreign
sources it seems certain that Chang Hsueh-Liang was influenced by
the Communists.

When Japan marched into Manchuria. Chang Hsueh..

Liang following Chiang's order withdrew his native troops from
Manchuria and moved to northwest districts of China.

In February,

1934. Chang waa appointed

co~~ander

suppress uRed Banditry."

During the battles with the Red Army

of the foroes assigned to

some officers of Chang were captured.
~~en

these offioers were released by the Red Ar.my, they

brought baok to Chang glowing acoounts ot the morale and organization in the Soviet distriots, but specially of the Red Armyts

...

"sincerity" in its appeals to stop civil wart to unity China b.1
peaceful democratic methods, and to unite to oppose Japanese
aggression.

Chang was impressed.

As a result slogans became

current in Chang's army, such as, "Chinese must not tight

Chinese.~

and ttunite all forces and fight back to our home, Manchuria."
In addition Chang could not forget that his father, Marshal
Chang Tauo-Lin, had been killed by Japanese action.
Chang that "Chinese fighting Chinese ft was illogical.

It seemed to
Through

Communist agents he finally reached agreement with the Red

A~y

to

cease hostilities in Shensi Province.
In December, 1936, Chiang Kai.Shek arrived at Sian, the capital of Shensi, to confer with Chang and urged him to hasten the
[task of fighting Communists.

On the night of December 12 Chang

revolted and detained Chiang, and under
~atched

~emand8,

Commun~

t prompting dis-

a circular telegram to the Nanking Government making eight
all of whieh were borrowed from the Communist program,

~united front against Japan."56
Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to accept a good portion ot the
pommunist united front policy.
~ar

broke out.

In July ot 1937 the Sino-Japanese

An "agreement," "understanding," and "guarantee"

petween Communists and the Kuo Min Tang was signed on the 22n4 of

56For details of Sian uprising and the Communist role in it
I. Jack, "A United National Anti-Japanese Front in China:' Mao
~nd others, China: The March Toward unt~J' PP. 2-17; also Edgar
~na", Red star over-aiiina, (New York,
8), PP. 20-29; 395-1-129 •
~ee

.......................................

j
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september.

However, there was no real "united rront" during the

War.
From the Stlnmler or 1939 to the beginning of 1940 China was in
serious danger.

China was close to surrendering to Japan.

Wang

the former chief ot cabinet of the Kuo Min Tang, had

~hin-Wei,

secretly surrendered to Japan in 1939 and set up a puppet govern..
~ent

in Nanking for the purpose of uniting with the Japanese agains

the Chinese Communists.

Because the Communists felt that Wang had

same sort of agreement with Chiang tai-Shek,57 hostilities were
renewed.
However, Mao Tse-Tung, on behalf of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, issued several declarations Which
again called .for a united-rront resistance to Japan instead of
attack against the Kuo Min Tang.
~gainst

Japan was fully apparent.

Now the Kuo Min Tang's resis.ance
Likewise, Communists saw that

without the resistance of the anti-Japanese Kuo Min Tang they could
not carryon against the Japanese.

Therefore, Mao declared:

~support the Kuo Min Tang-communist cooperation and overthrow the

anti-Communist poliey or Wang Chin-Wei."

Concerning the new

p.ostilities between the Communists and Kuo Min Tang, Mao simply
stated:

"strengthen national solidarity and eliminate internal

51 Mao

Tae-Tuns, "Unite All the Anti-Japanese Foroes and Com-

pat the Anti-Communist Die-Harden (A speech made February 1, 1940),
~elected ~vorks S?!. !!2 Tae-Turns. III (London, 1954.). ( 161-1t>6),
It>l.

..
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frictionl,,5 8

From that time on

Mao unceasingly

emphasis on appeal to avoid national friction,
would e1ther

repeated his

which of course

enhance the tendency of surrendering to Japan or

endanger the Red Army.

Such

statements were well

Chinese public opinion in Chungking.

received by

The idea had begun to grow

that even Chinese Communist control of China would be better than
surrender to the Japanese; "China tor the Chinese, rather than for
foreigners'"
~

Specific Activities

~

Resistance against Japan

The Chinese Communists accomplished a great deal, both in the
cities and the countryside, in winning support to them.

Their

achievements in the cities before World War II have been detailed
in the paragraphs dealing with the anti-Japanese movement.
the War their aim in the cities was mainly to

attract

During

those

stUdents and teachers who lived in the cities occupied by Japan.59
But the Communists' achievement in rural areas during the War is
more interesting and important.

There, Communist activities were

more successful during the War than before the War.

'l'he fo110wlng

58Mao Tse .... Tung, ftOvercome the Danger of Capitulation-Strive
to Mend the Situation" (a directive written on January 28, 1940),
Selected Works £!!!£ Tae-Tuns. III (157-160), 159.
59For details of how Communists endeavored to attract studentf
and teachers :from Japanese areas see the Communist documents,
quoted in Michael Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China,tNew York. 1950), pp. !Ol-Io~. 1'-7-12j, 130. --
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section discusses these activities.
Anti-Japanese selt-detense Corps.

The mobilization ot the

lPeasantry was the basic tactic ot Mao Tse-Tung in his Communist
revolution.

But after 1931, and partioularly atter 1937, the

~apanese

invasion gave Mao new opportunities to capitalize on the
~ass-resentment against Japanese, as Mao himself admitted. 60 He
started to arm the masses into a "Selt-detense Corps" as part ot ar.
~ti-Japanese

program as

~arly

as 1931, but his success became

signiticant only during the second World War.
The Selt-detense Corps was an "excellent institution for militarization ot the entire people in the anti-Japanese war, It as Mao
Tae-Tung himselt s&1d. 61

All men and women between the ages ot

sixteen and forty-tive were organized into the Selt-detense Corps,
without distinction aooording to social 01ass.8. 62

The methods ot organizing the masses were complex.
simplify them to &how the basic procedure.
~

Here we

When the Reds occupied

town or a village they first set vp a mass meeting to give

~easants

a theoretical lecture.

~.

The Communists would declare that

Ithe policy of contiscation of lands and properties would apoly onl,

60 Nym Wales, Inside Red China, (New York, 1939), PP. 264, 265;
Mao Tse-Tung, Ai:ects of China's anti-Japanese Struggle,
(Bombay, 1948), p. 2 •

~lso

61 Mao , Aspecta

£t

China's anti-Japanese strusgle, p. 37.

62~., pp. 21, 37.
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to the Kuo Min Tang's officers and the rich. and would be a policy
to liberate Chinese people tram Japanese

~peria11sts

because the

Kuo Min Tang and rich had not opposed the Japanese, wh11e the Red
Army was the real anti-Japanese army.63

Then the Red pol1tical

workers set out to "persuade" villagers to join in an anti-JapaneSE
Self-defense lorps.64
It was very important to arouse patriotism in order to get
the ignorant people to join in the anti-Japanese organization, as
a reporter eXPlaIned. 65 They were taught a brief history of
Japanese aggression, Which was traced from the early days, through
the Sino-Japanese War ot 1894-1895. to the last War.

This history

was given partly through the medium of drama and Harves t Dance or
Yang-Ko, which will be dealt wi th later, partly through "Winter
School. n66 partly through leisure time during the evening after
farming work.

In brief, whenever it was possible, illiterate

peasants were imbued with a deep-seated hatred for the Japanese. 67

63 snow, p. 195.
643medley, p. 154.
65Gunther stein, The ChallenS. of Red China, (New York, 1945)
p.335.
- -66AcCording to the writer •• mowledge, the Communist "Winter
School" is the Informal educaticnal Institution in the Red rural
districts. No certain days of attendance were set. The Communist
principally gave the peasants political training.
67Lindaay, pP. 69, '70, 74, 121.

The duties of the self-defense Corps, according to Mao Tee~g's

instructions, were: local vigilance, watch, and patrol, in-

formation about the enemy, rounding up of traitors, aid to anti~apanese

regular troops and guerillas in the transportation ot

supplies and wounded soldiers, cleaning of battle.tields
~d participating in coordinated warfare. 68
~illtary

According to Mao's instructions, some details of these activi.
~ies

are given below.

In each village and town there were many

~t. of the self-derense corps.69

In each unit there were certa1r.

persons loyal to Communists, the "hard core. 1f

It was these loyal

lPersons who controlled the unit and made its members perform their
~utie8

in the Red rear area.

The people of Self-derense Corps played a considerable role in
~ed

military operations.

~ntelligence
~ist8

They were part ot the Red Army's

organizations which tunctioned so well that the Commu-

could always rely on considerable advance information of

~nemy moves. 10

For example, if a person of village A saw the enemy

~ovlng,

he must inform village B immediately, regardless of weather

~illage

B must inform village OJ village 0 and the rest tollowed

~he

same procedure until the information reached the Communist
68Mao , Aspects ~ China's Anti.JaEanese strumsle, p.
69Ibid., pp.

4.0-4J..

10steln, p. 336.
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center.

Walking was substituted tor telephone wiresl

To show how the Communists utilized the peasants tor wartare,
we cite some interesting cases.

At the end of 1949 the Red

governors of several provinces made their respective reports.

Kuo

Tze-Hua, then the governor of Shang tung Province, which has a
population of thirty millions, reported that within three years
Shantung provided 14,040,000 peasant-soldiers_

Hsio Wang-T'Jng,

then the governor ot the north part ot Kiangsu Province, with a
population of about one hundred fifty millions, reported that his
area provided 1,015,000 men and women peasant-soldiers tor the
Hsuchow (city) Battle alone, and 1,660,000 for the Yantze River
Battle.

Tfzen Hsi-Wang, then the governor of north part ot Anhui

Province, whioh has a population of about twenty millions, reported that his area provided more than 8,000,000 men and women for
the Yantze River Battle alone. 7l
Such large numbers of the organized masses were never used
to tight JapanJ instead they
youth Utilization.

we~e

used to fight the Kuo Min

~ang.

The Communist Youth League, established

in 1931, had great importance tor the Communist movement.

Its

purpose was to attract and organize youth to provide the Chinese
Communists ot the tuture.

Meanwhile, it was advisable to utilize

71These reports are cited in the writer's diary ot 1949, base
upon the Chinese Communist newspapers. Women went to the battle
tor cooking and supplying water and tood, making shoes and unitorms, and 80 torth.

16
the youngsters to strengthen the rear.

In 1933 this organization

found seventy thousand recruits in the south central Red districts1
In 1931 there were some 40,000 members in the Northwest Soviet
Districts. 13
The C.y.t. divided the youngsters into two camps, the group
between eleven and sixteen was called Young Vanguards, who were a
branch of the Red Army, and the group between seven and fourteen
was euled HErh Tung 'l'uan" or "Children's Brigade."

The latter

was also known by the name of "Haio Kwei Ttleh" or ttLittle Devil
corps.n74

They did not particIpate in battle.

In the following

paragraphs we will simply describe the latter group.
For training the youth in the rural areas the Anti-Japanese
Military and Political Academy in the Central soviet District sent
out college students tor three-month periods to the countryside to
train the youngaters. 75
Principally the children had to learn some Communist worda
and simple slogans.

For examples it began with the words such

"man" or "human being," and went on to

"worker~"

"peasant," and

"soldier,tt then to "army," "Japanese ArnI7," "Red Army."

Later the

72wales, pp. 99, 101.
73snow, p. 333. According to the writer, the decrease of the
number ot C.Y.L. is due to the result ot the Anti-Communist
eampalgn. In 1936 the Red Army numbered only 30,000 men.
14Raymond J. de Jaegher, The Enemy Within, (New York, 1952),
p. 201.

15Wales, p. 307.
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children were taught questions and answers:
rice; a worker weaves cloth.

"A peasant produces

Why can't the peasant eat the rice

he produces and the weaver wear the cloth he weaves?"
there distinction between the poor andthe rich?"
the rich and poor anti-Japanese todaY'?"
Japanese are the most cruel on earth?ft
AI'my

tt~Vhy

is

"WhY' are both

"WhY' is it that the
"WhY' is it that the Red

is the anti-Japanese ArmY'?" and so forth. 76
An

important program in the children t • training was to give

them the ability to use Communist slogans.

Even a child of twelve

or fourteen at a mass meeting could make a simple but competent
explanation ot the current political situation, and parrot the
~easons

why

the Red ArJAY wanted to stop civil war and torm a

"united front" with all aga.inst Japanese aggression. 77
Children learned games, sports and crude shooting, everything
~one

in the spirit of Communism, of fighting Japanese, and of

opposing the Kuo Min Tang.
songs and dances.

They also had to learn propagandist

They had their own slogan squad., singing

squads, and dancing and dramatic troupes. 78
The duties of the ohildren were variou8---most important to
~ork

as orderlies, spies, "teachera" of the illiterate peasants,

468.
P. 335.

768m.d1ey, p.

77 sno'fl,

78 Wales , pp. 100-101.
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and dancers.

When they worked as

short, stout sticks.

orderlies~

they were armed with

It a traveler were not quick enough in

responding to their peremptory cries ot "stop," he would find himselt in trouble.

It a traveler tailed to Show his pass,19 the

Little Devils would accuse him of being the Kuo Min Tangls or
Japan's spy.

The children.s activities as spies were generally

devoted to collecting information about those who opposed the
Communists, including their own parents, but often they were sent
to Japanese. and Kuo Min Tang borders to procure information.
Children who taught the old, Illiterate peasants often beoame
nasty. spoiled by having more knowledge than the older generation.
It the old people lacked the patienoe to memorize or understand
the Communist terms they were acoused of having nfeudalist heads;"
people who "do not like to resist th$ Japanese. fl8a

Drama

~

D!Ace.

The whole history of the Communist movement

has been a grand propaganda tour.

There is no more powerful weapor

in the Communist arsenal of propaganda than the Red

dr~atic

troupes of the Jen-Min K'ang-Erh Chu-She or "People's Anti-JapanesE
Dramatic Society,"

This dramatic organization was selected and

formed trom the Vanguard Brigade, made up of boys and girls.

It

79Th. travel paes, aimed to avoid espionage, is a very 8eriou~
thing in the Red districts. According to the Communist regulatione
if a person wants to travel tive Li (12/3 miles) away, he must
apply for a pass from the Communist looal offioer.
BOde Jaegher, p. 202.
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was these
the Red
the

youngste~s

dist~iots,

slumbe~ing

who

t~avelled

sp~eading

ceaselessly back and forth in

the gospel of resistanoe and awakenin8

nationalism of the peasants.

When the Reds occupied

new areas, it was these dramatic troupe. who oalmed the tears of
the people. gave them rudimentary ideas ot the Communists and won
the people's confidence.
However badly they had erred, however exaggerated had been
~ade

the emphasis here or the

p~opaganda

st~ess

there, the Communists had the

aim to arouse the peasants of rural China; to awaken in

them a beliet that the Communists were the real fighters against
Japanese aggressors and that the Kuo Min Tang were not.

The pea-

sant, although he knew "small Japan" invaded China, did not know
the brutality ot the Japanese.

These teen-agel's made the picture

vivid in the peasants' minds.
A reporter gives us an eXQ.ll1ple ot the Red dramas whioh he saw
personally in the Soviet area. 81

This drama was a combination of

playlets, danoing, singing and pantomine.

'fhe "props" were primi-

tive, but the drama was more etfective for the

peasant~y

than the

!elaborate Chinese opera because it dealt with living issues.
The first playlet was called ttlnvasion. 1f
~anchu~ian

It opens in a

village, in 1931, with the Japanese arriving and

lOut the "non-resisting" Chinese

so1die~s.

~ivln@

In the second scene,

--_

---

81This example 1s in Snow, Red star Over China. pp. 101-102.

........

-~---------------
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Japanese officers banquet in a peasantls home, using Chinese men
tor chairs, and drunkenly making love to their wives.

Another

scene shows Japanese dope peddlers selling morphine and heroin and
forcing every peasant to buy a quantit~.82

A youth who refused to

buy is singled out tor questioning.

r

"You don't buy morphIne, you don't love Manchukuo ... Manchuria
puppet state). You are an anti-Japanese bandit." And the youth is
promptly

execute~.

A scene in the village market-place shows the

Japanese soldiers buying pork without payment.

wben the merchant

asks for money, they look at him in astonishment.
money?

~Vhy,

"You ask for

Chiang Kai-Shek gave us Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, the

Tangku Truce, the Ho-Umetsu Agreement • • • 83 without asking for
a sAngle penny,
~Yhereupon,

And you want us to pay for a little porkJ"

they impale him as a "bandit."

In the end, ot course, all this proves too mUch for the
villagers.

Merchants turn over their stands in the market-place,

farmers rush forth with their spears, women and children eome with
knives, and all swear to "tight to the deathtl against the Erh Pen
Kuei Tze---The Japanese Devils.
The Yang-Ko or Harvest Dance was another propaganda instrument

82The sale ot narcotics by the Japanese in North China and
Manchuria was prevalent before the War and during the War, but the
Chinese were not forced to buy it.
83Ho-Umetsu Agreement is the result of the Autonomous Movemen1
of North China, 1935.

-

---------------
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which was used to arouse the militance of peasants.

Its origins

date baok to the Sung Dynasty, a thousand years ago, the tradition.
81 harYest danoe performed ohiefly at New Year's and other festiya]

days.

But the Communist artists reformed it for propaganda purposE

in rural China.
There are various subjeots depicted in the harvest dances.
Mostly they deal with battle affairs: the story of a village
traitor, the heroism of a soldierta wife, the atrocities of the
Japanese in their mopping-up campaigns. 8 4
The Harvest Dance is exquisitely done by a group of girls or
boys, or both.

Barefooted, clad in peasant trousers and coats and

fancy vests, with silk bandannas on their heads, they performed
with unison and grace, gesturing and speaking.
both by gestures and speech.
conveyed the spirit of dance.

The story is told

Pantomine and gesture realistioally
The Harvest Dance gets more

emotional effect than any communist indoctrinational speeoh oan
get.
popular among the Harvest Dances was the "United Front

Dance,~

which depicted the mobilization of villagers to resist Japan.

A

group ot youths wearing sailors l white jumpers and caps appeared
as a cavalry formation, another group appeared aa an aviation
corpa, another performed as foot-soldiers, and the rest as navy.85
84rIarrison Forman, Report ~

!!.!!! China (New York, 19t~5),p. 64

85snow, Red star OVer China, pp. 102-103.

82
Whenever an anti-Japanese battle was rought, no matter how
the battle might be, a Harvest Dance was perrormed immediate-

~lall

ly to exaggerate the Red Army's power and to win the peasants'
conridence.

During the latter period or tbe Sino-Japanese war the

Harvest Dance was mainly perrormed to induce the people to distrust
the Kuo Min Tang.

Such dances were so attractive that many college

proressors devoted themselves to performing such shows, during the
beginning of the Red regtme set up in Peking.
To sum up, basically most of the Chinese had prejudice against
the Japanese.

Because of the Japanese military hostilities agains1

China the general anti-Japanese resentment became fiercer.

The Kuc

Min Tang's policy concerning Japan was not well understood by the
Chinese public.

The Communists, therefore, took a full advantage

of psychology to perform a campaign or the "united front against
Japan."

Before the last World War the Cbinese Communists won a

great number of the "patriots" in the cities.

During the War the

Communists again taking advantage of the consensus of the publio
opinion on resistanoe against Japan expanded the Red Army in rural
areas.

Concerning such Communist movement an American reporter

gave a comment that anti-Japanese slogans had become the core of
Communist propaganda, and that it was the anti-Japanese campaign
~hich sustained the Communists through several years or harship.86

86 snow, ~ Battle !£! Asia, (Shanghai, 1941), p. 130.
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CHAPTER IV
ANTI-AMERICANISM
As soon as the Chinese Communists came into power, their "one
sided" policy was made obvious.

In the present China there is no

freedom to discuss imperialists except according to Communist
interpretation:

Russians are Chinats friends and Americans are

imperialists, the enemy of the Chinese people.

Before going on to

an anal¥sis of the grounds and tactics ot the pro-Russian and anti
American policy we might present same description of the Chinese
attitude towards Americans.
.........
The Chinese Attitude toward ..;.;;.0;.;..;.;;..,;;;,..;;...;;;;.
Americans

_

..;;;..0,.0-....";;";;;'_ _ _ _ _.;;;.,;;._ _

...;,..;,.,.;.........._

Simply and generally speakinl, the attitude adopted by the
Chinese people toward America is both favorable and unfavorable.
This idea is not contradictory it ce:rtain facts are considered.
It is true that American participation in the suppression of
the Boxers' Rebellion and the "open door" policy have not been
looked upon by the Chinese intellectuals as desirable events for
China.

But the Chinese, too, have conceded that the Boxers'

Rebellion

was not a rebellion

of

appreciable importance

for

84
~h1na.l

They also ~emamber that the Boxer indemnity shared by

~erica

was returned by America to the Chinese for educational

welfa~e.

The open door policy, likewise, no longer is considered

by the Chinese as an example ot military aggression against China.
The~efore,

the Chinese people have a rather favorable attitude

toward America as compared with other countries such as Britain,
France, Japan, and Russia.

So in China people commonly say that

"America is better than the other countries" when they talk about
"foreign imperialists."
During the

!CUO

policy prevailed.

M.ln Tang regime pro-Amel'ican and anti-Russian

The efreats of this policy were significant

because the Chinese people saw that there had never been any
American concessions and particular privileges in eh1na.

On the

contrary, the Chinese realised that Russia had important military
and political conflicts with China both in the past and the modern
times.
Some Qhinese folksayings ahow this distinctive attitude towarc
Americans.

The Chinese used to call America ItTa Lo Mei" (the big

America) and American people "Mei Kuo Ta Shao Yeh" (American playboy).

These appellations in the Chinese language have respectful

connotations.

However, the Chinese used to call the Russians

IThe Boxers' Rebellion is condemned by Chiang Kai-Shek and
praised by Mao Tse-Tung. Most of Chinese intellectuals in modern
times do not endorse the Boxers' activities.

--

---

-

-----
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UEh-Kuo Ta-Pi-Tze" (Russian big nose) or "Chung Lo Eb tt (poor old
Russia), both comtemptoou8 terms.
It is also true, on the other hand, that the Chinese have an
unfavorable attitude toward Americans.
unravorable attitude is the
American way of life.

soci~

An important factor in the

gulf between the Chinese and

The Chinese people have misunderstood the

Americans, particularly the American troops who were stationed in
China during the last War.

The Chinese people, in viewing AmericaI

customs, complained 1?hat "Americana are sO tree," nso impolite,"
and "so romantic. 1t

Americans seem free beoause they are more

friendly than the Chinese in expreseing the "j.ndi vidual manners
and attitudes.

Americans seem impolite because they are more

in meeting people than the Chinese are.

fran~

Americans seem romantic

because they do not show embarrassment such as the Chinese do when
women and men meet together.

ot major importance is that the idea

of the American way of life accepted by the Chinese people is that
which appeared in Hollywood films,

The Chinese people concluded,

therefore, that Americans are t'not so moral."

An American sociologist has reported that the Chinese antiAmerioan attitude has been influenced by some "concealed contempt"
adopted by Americans toward the people of China. 2 One of the
important factors in the "concealed contempt" idea seems to be
20. F. Marden, Minorltl ~ ~erican Soclet~, (New York, 1952),
p. 170.

--

-

--~----------
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Chinese primitive sanItary condIticns.3

When Americans, particu-

larly missionaries and soldiers, went to China and confronted the
prtmitive sanitary conditions, they sometimes did little to conoea
their opinion of the Chinese as dirty people.

The Chinese people,

in turn, reacted against the Amerioans.
Another psychological faotor might be Chinese jealousy of the
"luxury" of the American living.

Although it is difficult to make

a oomparison of the Chinese and American living conditions, it

must be agreed that in China there is a general poverty.

In the

Chinese culture, poverty can give people encouragement, while
luxury tends to drown people in immorality; if a person lives in
the lap of luxury, he cannot withstand hardship of his life and it
is diffioult for him to know the future.
regard the American people in general.

The Chinese people thus
They say that Americans

have money, but they do not have a high moral tone in their societ
Concerning the American $oldiers, the writer heard from the Chines
that American and British soldiers could not fight a hard battle
during the Second World War; they won because they had money and
weapons.

Also American students have been regarded by Chinese

students in China as not working hard in sohool because their
families have "plenty of money."

JA description of Chinese primitive sanitary conditions is in
Gerald F. Winfield, "China Basic Problems," Foreign Policy Reports
XXV (March 15, 1949), 2-~.
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A common sociological and psychological theory holds that
"prejudice against one mInority group [is] generally accompanied by
prejudIce against all other groups.n4

Thus, the unfavorable atti-

tude adopted by the Chinese people toward Americans might be
psychologically influenced by the hostile attitude toward other
foreigners.

The psychological precept is this: \Vhen people fall

themselves, they will complain against everything and everybody.
So in modern China the Chinese people often say, "Americans are
foreigners; foreigners are always pro-foreigners," or "America wil
stand by another foreign country rather than by China."

But, to

be sure, the modern Chinese peoDle (except Communists) do not see
America as the "imperialist aggressor" against China.
Finally, it must be pOinted out again, the unfavorable attitude toward America is less when political issues are eonsidered.
The attitude toward other foreign countries, particularly Russia.
is rather a traditional resentment, which is more based on international political conflicts.

Consequently, the Communists have

made efforts to shift resentment from Russia toward America.

They

have endeavored to promote their one-sided program to the extreme.
~ Co~ist

Reasons

!2!

---

Teaching People

~

Resent

America and Befriend Russia

----~~

------~ ----~

4Jerome Hlmelhoch, "A Personality type Associated with
Race prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Arnold M. Rose,
(New York, 19:5I), p. 487. -

Prejud1ce~
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General Observations.

Moscow regards the democratic politi-

cal and economic system of the United states as a paramount threat
to the Soviet Union.

During the early days of the Chinese Commu-

nist movement, following Moscow's instruction, anti-AmericanisM
was promoted, as was seen in the second chapter.

Before and

during World War II, Mao Tse-Tung did not forget that "American imperialism" was threatening the U.S.S.R. even while he was engaged
in an anti-Japanese campaign.
In regard to the Chinese Communist movement there has been a
remarkable difference in the policies adopted by Russia and by the
United States.

For example, during the incident ot the 30th Move-

ment of 1925, at Shanghai, which was organized by the Communists,
the United states, tollowing the British and Japanese, sent warships to Shanghai.5

But Moscow sent several congratulatory

messages to China urging the Chinese to continue the struggle untiJ
they had completely ousted all toreign imperialist..
messag~

A typioal

for example, stated that the Soviet Union was closely

following the fight ot China's workmen and students for emancipation from the yoke ot foreign oapitalists and imperiallsts. 6
For another example, in March, 1927, Nanking was captured by
the army led by a Communist leader Lin Pai-Chu, and a violent riot

--_

5The New York ....................
Times, June 2, 1925, p. 2; June 3, 1925, p. 1.
6Ibid., June 8, 1925, p. 4.

-

against foreign res1dents and their properties occurred. 7 The
United states, tor the protection ot its citizens, joined with the
British in shelling Nanking, as a result of which, it was reported,
200~QOO Chinese were kllled. S But Moscow called the Nanking case

1& "blood. ba'lfh in Nanking," made by Amerioans,

A Pravda editorial

Istated. "The oountry ot George Washington and the declaration of
Independence now appears before China 1n the shape ot the monster
Williams who drowns the independenoe of the Chire 8e people in a
flood ot blood."

At the same time a manifesto issued by the

Comintern Central Committee
~ith

sa~d:

"The United states, who flirted

the Nationalist movement and ooquetted with the Chinese revo-

~ution,
~ilitary

threw otf the rosy mask in one instant and revealed her
leadership 1n the work of mass murder and the destruction

~d ruin of' Chinese oities."9

On

the following day the Foreign

Minister of Kuo Min Tang sent to the Amerioan Consulate regrets
Por the loss of' American lite.

The Chinese Communtsts declared

funerica to be "imperialist."
According to Communist politioal philosophy, the Chinese

1Hu Hua, Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ko ~ Shih, p. 86: also see
26, 1927, p. 1;

~ New YorkTliiiii, -rarCh2~'9"2r, p;-rJ lireh
!.arcii27~21, pp. lf3J Maroh 28, 1927, p. 1.

8The New York Times, ~~areh 25, 1927, p. 20; March ~e, 1927,

p. 1. - - -

-

9Ibid., March 28, 1927, pp. 1, 3.
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revolution is a part of the world revolution.

This has been in-

sisted on trom the hirth of the Chinese Communist Party up to the
present time.

The anti-Japanese War was viewed by Mao Tse-Tung as

a part of war against world fmperialists. 10

For solving a "part

of the world problem" a unity of China with Soviet Union is indispensable because nthe Soviet Union,11 Mao Tee-Tung asserted, "will
be in the vanguard to shake hands with us [communist~ .1111 During
the early days of the Communist-Kuo Min Tang campaign, the Communist Party from time to time received practical cooperation from
Moscow.1 2

At the same time the Kuo Min Tang had friendly relation-

ships with the United States for more than twenty years.
Another assumption regarding the creation of a general hatred
for the United states would seem to be that the Chinese
hoped to tap and utilize it at opportune movements.

Commun~

ts

It was also

important that they try to eradicate any fear of western countries,
particularly of the United states, and

to strengthen

Chinese

lOEdgar Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung" (made on NovembeI
5, 1936), Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March toward UIit y ,
p. 35; Mao Tse-Tung, Aspects of China's Antr:Japanese strus~ e, p.
48; Mao, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist par~ (aextbool
written in Decemoer l~~~), Selectia works of Mao Tse- ng, III
(72-101), 96; Mao, Hsin Min ~hU Qnu ! Lun TOn~w Democracl)
(written in January-:-r940'}, TPikfng,-l~) ,pp70-!2.
llSnow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung," Mao Tse-Tung and othel"
China: !h! March toward Unit:, p. 40.
12Tang Leang-Li, Suppressins
1934), pp. 59-61.

£i

Communist-BanditrI. (Shanghai,
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feeling of self-respect which might be important for the confidence of the masses in the Communists.
Communist Interpretations.

To the Chinese Communist mind

Russian policy seeks for a perpetual peace for mankind.

When the

world accuses Russia of creating social chaos, Mao Tse-Tung is
moved to answer in this way:
For a long time the Soviet Unionts foreign policy has
consistently been a peace policy, whioh means precisely that the interests oE the Soviet Union are interwoven with the interests of the majority of mankind. In
the past, the Soviet Union not only needed peace for
socialist construction and had to strengthen its peaceful relations with other countries for the prevention
of anti-Soviet war, but had to check the aggression of
the fascist countries. to curb the war~ongering activities of the so-called democratic countries, and to
delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war as long
as possible so as to win peaoe on a world-wide scale.
For years the Soviet Union1has devoted great efforts
to the oause of the world. 3
In looking, however, at Amerioan policy, Mao insisted that
when the United states adopted "the policy of nominal nonintervention" toward an aggressive country, it was in reality
oooperating in the aggression.

Mao, referring to the Japanese

war against China, stated that when Japan invaded china

the

United states and other oountries adopted a policy ot nnon_
intervention,tt but the Soviet union not only

followed a policy

of non-aggression with China bu, also aotively helped China in

l3Mao Tse-Tung, "The Unity between the Interests of the
Soviet Union and the Interests ot Mankind" (written on september
28, 1939), Seleoted W~ 2.! ~ Tae-Tung, III, It4.
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he~ ~esiatanc •• 14 Mao Tae-Tung conveniently fo~got the nonagg~esslon

pact which Soviets and Japanese entered into at the

beginning of the

JapaneseWa~.

Concerning the

Seco~d Wo~ld

War, Mao, in the same statement,

said "The governments of Britain, France and the United states had
no genuine deslre to prevent the
p~eolpitated
B~italn

lts

outb~eak."

and France desired

to come to

te~s

g~eat

war, but on the contrary

To lndicate that the Unlted States,
wa~,

Mao continued: ttFor they refused

with Soviet Union, to conclude wlth it a really

effectlve pact of mutual asslstance • • • this proves that tlley
only wanted wa~ and did not want peace.nlS
Mao

ag~eed

with Stalln that the United states lntended to

"sit on top of a mountain to watch the tigers flght" and would
come down to wind up the wholeaffalr When the Sovlet Union and
Germany should have worn each other out in fighting. l6

He forgot

that the American military supplies and the Second Front opened by
Eisenhowe~

aaved the Soviet Unlon from falling into Hitler's hands,

On December 20, 1939, Mao Tse-Tung, while offering congratulations tor

~talints

blrthday, explained why Stalin's Sovlet Union

was the true friend of China: "No other country has renounced its

14Ibld.,
..........
15..........
Ib1d •

p.

45 •
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special rights and privileges in China; the soviet Union has done
this.
ltDuring the First Great Revolution, all the imperialists were
opposed to us; the Soviet Union alone aided us.
"In the Anti-Japanese War, no government of any imperialist
country has really given us help, the Soviet Union alone has helped us with aeroplanes and supplies.
"Is this not clear enough?,,17
Mao Tse-Tung in January, 1940, insisted that the Chinese revolution was a "new democratic reVolutIon," based on the principIes ot Marxism-Leninlsm-Stallnlam, that for victory the Chinese
revolution must rely on the Soviet Union, and without itussian help.
China could not win. 18

Mao also predicted that all countries in

the whole world would be swept into either of two camps; that
neutrality would be merely a deceptive phrase; that the Chinese
must stand at the socialist side. 19
Mao's opinion of the Vnited states became openly more hostile
after he came into power.

He made a speech before the 28th anni-

versary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party.
that under the leadership of

Soviet Union

Mao's theme was

in the Second World

17Mao , "Stalin Is the Friend of Chinese People," Selected
Works .2!. !!.2. Tse-Tuns. III, 102-103.

------ ----- ......... --- - --

l8Mao , Rsin Min Chu Chu I Lun, p. 23.

-

19Ihi«., pp.

25, 36.
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War three big imperialist countries had been defeated and two big
imperialist countries had been weakened, and only one big imperial
ist country, America, continues as a power; "American imperialism
intends to enslave the whole world, and she is supplying weapons
to Chiang Kai-Shek to kill millions of Chinese people. tt20
In the same statement Mao indicated that China needs international help from the socialist countries, but she does not want
American aid, beoause American rulers are "imperialists" who can
never give "people's oountry" real aid. 21

Now, Mao, in this

speech, made clear the policy of the Red regime: "Chinese people
must either stand

at

the imperialist side or at the socialist side

there 1s no neutral road; but we oppose the imperialist side, and
we oppose the imagination of neutrality."22

Finally, Mao conclud-

ed that "we must unite with the Soviet Un1on, we must learn from
the SOViet Union. n23
During the year 1949, Russian "advisers" began to pour into
China; and the Chinese intellectuals, in general, had the feeling
that these "advisers" seemed interested only in political affairs.
~~e

intellectuals doubted the value of such advisers, and general

2OMao , tun Jen Min Min Chu Chutan Chin (~ Peoplets Democrati(
DictatorshlJ)J,(Peking; ~9r;-pp. 8:-4..

-

2lIbld. , PP. 8, 9.
22Ibid. , p. 7.

-

23Ibld. , p. 17.
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opposition was prevalent.

At the same time the Chinese people

were aware that Russia had been moving industrial equipment from
Manchuria while the United states poured into China a billion
dollars worth of relief goods and industrial equipment for reconstruction.
Liu Shao-Chi, then the vice-president of Red Government, mad.
a statement which was characteristic of the attempt to mitigate
anti-Russian attitudes and strengthen Sino-Russian friendship.
Since he is an important man in shaping the ties of China with the
Societ Union, we quote his article at length:
We speCially prize this friendship and cooperation
between Chinese and Soviet people because the path traversed by the Soviet people is the path which we Chinese
will 800n take. The experiences of the Soviet people in
national construction are worthy of careful study by the
Chinese people. The Chinese revolution attained the
Victory of today because we learned fram the SOViet
Union in the past and took "Russia as teaCher." Henceforth, we are going to build up the country, and must
likewise take "Russia as teacher" and study the experiences in national construction of the Societ people.
The Soviet Union has now much scientific knowledge
which is enti~ely new and unknown to the rest of the
world. We can learn such scientific knowledge only
from the Soviet Union. For example_ in the tield of
economics, banking, public finanoe commerce_ education,
etc., the Soviet Union has an entirely new set of
theory which other countries of the world do not have,
not to mention her advanced political science and military science. Soviet culture is an entirely new culture. The pressing task betore the Chinese people today 1s to absorb the new culture of the Soviet Union
and to make it the orientation for building up the new
China. Henoe we Chinese are especially in need of
friendly aid and cooperation of the Soviet people. 24

24Liu Shao-Chi. "Sino-Soviet Friendship". China l/eeklv Review

Llu Shao-Chi made another statement of revealing importance.
Liu distinguishes the nAmeric~n imperialist camp" and the ftantiAmerican imperialist camp" more sharply than Mao Tse-Tung.

Liu

stated:
When these two camps are in sharp conflict, people line
up with one side or the other. That is, if one is not
in the imperialist camp, if one is not assisting American imperialism and its accomplices to enslave the world
or one's own people, then one must be in the anti-imperialist camp assisting all oppressed peoples of the
world fighting to achieve liberation, or fighting for
the liberation of onets nation against Amerioan imperialism and its aceomplioes---the reactionaries in all
countries. This means one is assisting the Soviet Union]
the New Democracies ot Eastern Europe, the people's de~
moeratic foroes in the United states and other countries.
To remain neutral or sitting on the fence is impossible
• • •• In order to win its liberation, every oppressed nation has no alternatiVe but to oppose American imperialism and • • • to unite with the Soviet Union ••
•• No nation can win real liberation any other w8'1.25
In January, 1950, Soong Ching-Ling (widow of Sun Yat Sen), a
vice-president ot the Red Government, made a comparison of the
United states with Russia. 26

She partioularly pointed out that th

Marshall Plan could produce only economio catastrophe for those
countries which received Ameriqan aid.

A statistical ana17sis of

Soon clatmed that there had been a serious economic crisis and

(ShanghaI'), CXV, No.9

(October 29, 1949), 142.

25Liu Shao-Chi, Internationalism and ~ationalism (written
in 1948), (Peking, 1950), pp. 32-33. --26"The Difference Between Soviet and American Foreign Policies," People's China, I, No.2 (January 16, 1950), 5-8.
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unemployment problem in Italy, France, Britain, and west Germany
since these countries received Marshall Plan aid.
Soongts analysis also claimed to show that there had been a
great increase of industrial product and economic prosperity in
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, poland, and
Red China, since these received "Stalin Plan" aid.

soongts theory

is that the Marshall Plan was mainly aimed to educate people to
follow the leadership of the United states; the stalin Plan, however, was aimed to "sincerely aid the development of the [Red]
Countries."

Soong concluded that the United states is an im-

perialist country and the Sovlet Union is the democratic.
Propaganda

~

Means

~

Training

~

People

The Chinese Communist movement is a grand propaganda tour, as
mentioned previously.

According to Mao Tse-rrung every Chinese

must be a propagandist: "Who is a propagandist?

Not only is the

teacher a propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, the
literary writer a propagandist, but all our cadres in all kinds of
worts are also propagandists •• • •

Any person engaged in

with another person 1s engaged in propaganda. u28

talki~~

In Red China,

therefore, the news, art, llterature, mass meetlngs, and schools,

28 Mao Tee-Tung, "Opposing Party Formalism" (a speech made in
February, 1942), quoted In Chen Hsi-En, "Education and propaganda
in Communist China", The Annals of the American Academl of Political ~ Soclal Sclence;-COLXXII tseptember, 1951}, 113. --

are full of propaganda, the propaganda ot anti-Americanism.

It is

worthwhile to introduce a number of examples of this propaganda.
Regarding the defeat of the Japanese in the last War the
Chinese people believed that it was the Kuo Min Tang's eirftt years
resistance. America's tremendous aid. and especially the two atomi
bombs which forced

Japa~ts

earlier surrender.

The Chinese people

realized that Russian participation in the Japanese War did not
play an important role.
the Communist Party Line.

However, this conviction deviated from
Communists through their newspaper and

magazines began to reject the "incorrect" viewpoint during the
year 1949.

One of the interpretations, which was made on August

15, 1949, seems to be typical:
The surrender of the Japanese pirates resulted
trom the heroic eight-year resistance of the Chinese
people. and especially of the Red Eighth Route Army
under the leaderabip of the Communist Party • • • • The
final factor bringing about the Japanese surrender was
the Soviet declaration of war on Japan on August 8,
1945 • • •• Within a week the Soviet Red Army. in conjunction with the forces of Outer Mongolia. •• destroyed or captured 764,000 men of the Japanese Imperial
Kuantung Army • • •• If the soviet Union had not sent
troops into Manchuria, a military decision could not
have been reached so speed~ly, therefore Japan still retained a very powerful army at the time • • • with
which it could have continued resistance against the
allied forces • • • •
The American imperialists, however, with their
running dogs, the Kuo Min Tang reactionaries, spread
propaganda to the effect that the defeat of Japanese
tasoism resulted solely from the use of two atomic
bombs. Such talk 1s oompletely deceptive, for even
though Soviet partioipation in the Japanese war came
late, the fact remains that, if the Soviet people ead
not been ready, with their spirit of lofty self-sacrifice, to resist and destroy Hitlerts great armies in the
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west, America would certainly have been unable to conduct her offensive against Japan in the Pacific • • • •
The purpose of this deceptive talk on the part of
the Americans and their running dogs is to conceal their
sin of seizing and holding the fruits of Victory for
themselves alone', and, by exaggerating the power of the
atomic bomb, to terrorize the people of the world's various peace-loving cquntries in order to facilitate
their own dark designs for conducting new aggression as
conditions permit • • • .29
One might wonder how many people were convinced by the communist interpretation.

To answer is difficult.

An important consi-

deration in any answer would be the success the Communists have in
indoctrinating the young generation.
A popular pampnlet in Communist-dominated China is called
American Imperialist's Bloody Historl of Aggression in China,
which gives America the dubious credit of having a share in every
war against China.

A summary of this small book is given below.

In 1842 American soldiers helped English soldiers fight the
Opium War.

In 1874 an American admiral placed the American flag

on Formosa and declared it independent.

In 1875. the United state

consul at J.t'ukien went to Japan and urged that the United states
and Japan take Formosa.
states

attack~d

Korea.

In 1884, together with Japan. the United
Ten years later the United states helped

Japan to start the Sino-Japanese War.

In 1900 America joined the

other imperialists in taking Peking, because of the obstinacy of

29Q.uoted in Derk Bodde, pekins Diary,
(New York, 1950), pp. 237-238.

!.!!!.!: .2!.
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some missioners.

In 1964 the United states used forty million

dollars to help Japan in the war so as to share in the spoils of
China's northeast provinces.

In 1912, America joined the European

Powers in exploiting China afteJ.' declaring for the "open door."
In

1925 American inteJ.'ference stopped the Communist revolution in

China and set up a government favorable to 8merica.

American re-

lief was given to unload American surpluses and make economic
slaves of China atter the War.

Arms were given Chiang Kai-3hek

and his reactionary government, which cost more blOod and lives in
the Communist revolutionary army fighting to liberate China.30
On the contrary, Russia has no record of any aggression
against China aa tar as the Communists are concerned.

When Ohine54

intellectuals and western observers viewed Sino-Russian friendship
wi th a doubtful attitude, the vice-minister of the Educal;ion De-

partment in peking stated: "The treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance is based on truth and justlce. ft
The imperialists, the vice-minister pointed out, intend to slander
and blacken the Soviet and Chinese people when they talk about the
questions ot ManchurIa, Mongolia, and Sinkiang.

Also he added:

The Chinese people have never, under any circumstance, been antllRussian."3 l

30Reterred to by Mark Tannien, No Secret Is Safe, (New York,

P.952),

p.

128.

-

--

31Chien Chun Ju1, "Let the Imperialists TrembleJ" People's
PhIna, I, No.5 (March 1, 1950), 5-7.
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Since the Chim se people have been aware of the Russian
occupation of Arthur and Dairen, a typical device of Communist interpretation appeared in March, 1950.

It indicated that the

Russian occupation of Arthur and Dairen was for the liberation of
Chinese residents there; the living standards, industrial products
children's education, and women's movement were improved to a grea
degree after the arrival of "the Soviet protectors," so that the
Chinese people "love the Soviet protectors. tt32
A book entitled .Q.a Americanism was published in 1949.

The

ti tle of the first chapter asks n'Nhat Is Americanism?" and the
rest of the volume is devoted to proving that the answer really is
fascism.

The book attempts to 4emonstrate that the United states

has already become a police state with secret police (FBI) and the
"slave labor" Taft-Hartley Law.
The result of the ftfascist control of the United states" is a
combination of war-mongering and degeneracy.

Vyshinsky before the

United Nation General Assembly of September 18, 1947, denounced
the United states leaders as warmongers.

A typical elaboration of

the theme appeared in the Peking papers on November 26, 1950:
"There has been a big national boom in caves [in the United state~
Slick real estate merchants are helping to spread panic among the
bourgeoisie and cashing in by otfering for sale dry, deep, sizable

32Chow Hsueh-Sheng, ttThe story of Port Arthur and Dairen,1t
People's China. I, No. b (March 16, 1950), 6-7. 27.

102
caves in Arizona and other remote spots.

A lunatic character

named Bobson has built an underground city in Kansas which he has
called Eureka.

There he is setting up offices and homes, with all

modern conveniences."33
The Chinese Communists seemingly do not dream that the free
world might not believe what they say.

Thus, WU Hsiu-Ch'uan, the

representative of Red Government invited to attend the United
Nations assembly, made a bitter denounciation of the United states
before the United Nations on November 28, 1950. 3L~

Referring to

the Korean War WU insisted that it was started by the United
states, and that the Unite4 states Government was designed 90lely
to furnish a pretext for launching aggression againRt every Asian
country.

Att·er the War, Wu pointed out, only because of the

efforts and sacrifices of the people of China and

Rus~ia

the power

of Japan in China was weakened; and taking advantage of this
opportunity the United states stepped up the execution of its poli
cy of sole dominance over China.
To oppose the general feeling that Americans have been the
traditional friends of the Chinese people, Wu asserted that
Americans are imperialists who have never been the friends of the

33Quoted in Richard L. Walker, "Communist China Looks at the
United states;' !!!! Revie,:w, XLI (Autumn 1951), 2934Text of

1/VU'8

speech is in The New York Times, November 29,

1950, section 1, pp. 14·16.

--- --- ----
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Chinese; instead they have always been the Chinese enemies as
history shows.

Wu's attack is not a new thing.

Betore the Korean

War the Communist Party had already made similar charges, but they
were hardly noticed in

t~

United states.

Liu Shao-Ch'! in November 1948 made this statement:
Even during the Second World War, the American imperialists had made their plans for plundering and oppressing all the nations of the world. After the war,
they put the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan into operation, thus step by step bringing many oountries and
nations of the world under their own control and rule •
• •• And their aggressive plans just like those of
Hitler, Mussolin1 and Japanese warlords, are being car~
rled out under the slogan ot "defence against the
SoViet, defense against Communism."
In order to put their plan for enslavement of the
whole world • .. • the American imperialists • • • have
to carry out propaganda among the American people about
the "theory" of the so-called tf American Century!! and
the "theory" of the "superiority ot the white race," declaring that the United states should tflead the world" •

.. • .3;,

The charges about the ttAmerican Century," "superiority or
white race," "America is the leading country of the world" have
been a current phenomenon in China a.1"ter the War.

Liu t s charge

seems an attempt to regenerate the Chinese traditional self-feelinf
of "supremacy," in order to conquer a fear of America.
The

~-~ ~-!!2

(Southern DailZ)' official organ of the

CCP in Canton, published an article almost at the same time that
Wu Hsiu-Chuan was in the United states.

This article made an even

35Liu Shao-Ch'i, Internationalis~ ~ Nationalism,(Peking,

1949), pp. 27-28.
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stronger attaok on the United states.
EYery Chinese oitizen who is willing to recognize
facts may discern what kind of country the United states is. This is a country which 1s thoroughly reactionary, thoroughly dark, thoroughly corrupt, thoroughly
cruel. This 1s • • • the hell of countless m11lions of
poor people. This is the parad1se of gangsters, swindlers, rascals, special agents, tascist germs, speculators, debauchers, and all the dregs of mankind. This
is the world's manufactory and source or all such crimes
as • • • darkness, cruelty • • • op)ression ot man by
man, and cannibaliam. This is the exhibition ground ot
all the crimes which can possibly be committed by mankind. This is a living hell ten times, one hundred
times, one thousand times worse than any hell that can
be depicted by the most sanguinary of writers • • • •
Conscientious persons can only wonder how the spiritual
civilization of mankind can be depraved to such an extent' Here is the graveyard of truth, righteousness,
reason, progressiveness, science and culture • • • •
Everyone who is conscientioUS, rational, truth-worshipping, willing to uphold the dignity and morality ot mankind and unwilling to see mankind degraded to a level
lower than a~als, cannot help arising in righteous in.
dignation to condemn the cursed phenomena ot this oursed
place. E~.ryone who does not want the people of this
beloved fatherland contaminated by these criminal phenomena is charged wit~ the responsibility 9f arising to
condemn her, curse ~er,and despise her.3 b
Such oharges against the United states deal chiefly with the
ff

American way of life. tt

Since the Chir.e se Communist view is

presented within a Marxist-Leninist framework, the IIAmerican way
of lire " is pictured as a life of increasing oppression of the
proletariat by the American capitalists.

This is made easier by

the fact that the high. standards of living in the United states or
the rreedomsot the people are beyond the understanding ot the

36Quoted in Walker, PP. 26-27.
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poor Chinese people.
For the young people, songs, cartoons, and small pamphlets
are good eduoation devices.
IntroduCing

One such typioal pamphlet is entitled

!h! paper Tiger, Imperialist Amerioa. The

ti~er

fills

Chinese painting a.nq. literature and is the "bogy" used to frighten
people, as the "big, bad wolf" is used in American children's
books.

Amerioa, in this pamphlet, is called a "paper tiger"---a

big bluft-- as Mao Tse-TUng used to use the word to symbolize the
ftimperialist" country.

This pamphlet belittles the Amerioan atomi

bomb as a weapon of no use against armies, a weapon which can be
used only to kill the defenceless civilian populations of large
cities.

It America should risk bombing China, Russia would im-

mediately carry retaliation to the "American imperialism."

The

pamphlet also encourages the Chinese youngsters to believe that
American soldiers are soft, raised on luxuries, and cannot take
the hardship at fighting.
Another booklet for youth bears the title Instruction
youth

!! ~

Age

~

Reason.

On each page it has cartoons.

~

It

picture. America as a hog that lives on blood, blood let by war.
'Nhen buainess is bad, America starta a war so the capitalists can
make money and retain their power.
Another, The Two Fronts, is given over to exposing the "aggre
sion" of America primarily, though a small share in the "sin" is
attributed to England and France.

The Imperialistic aggression is

I"
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compared to the admirable peace front of Russia.

Naturally all th

conferences, the meetings, the societies, the propaganda and
efforts Russia has given for peace are recorded.
The Communists also translated RUsSian propaganda into the
Chinese language.
Standar~s

One such translation 1s called The Livine

of Russian People, and is designed to attract students

of high schools.

It pictures Russia as a paradise and her people

as living the most comfortable of lives.
An article by Hu Sheng entitled "American Aggression Against
China through the Course of Historylt appeared in a Peking journal
on November 20, 1950.

The author said: flShowing his white-gloved

hand, the American imperialist would say to the Ch1nese
'Look at my hand; how clean it isl
sive action against China.

peop~

:

I have never taken any aggres-

I have always been Chinats good

friend.'
"Pulling off his gloves, you will see his blood of the Chines
people, blood of the Asian peoples, which cannot be cleaned."37

To prove the moral decadance of the Americans, one Pek1ng
magazine carried the following account under the title "Lying is
Wonderful!"
The American Liars Club is ~wenty years old. In order
to celebrate the twentieth anniversary, a ly1ng compe_ition was held to determine the world champion liar. At
the beginning of the contest • • • the Chairman of the
37 Quoted in ibid., p. 31.

-
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club said: "Lying is a great art, a great movement. We
hope to discover many new talents this year." Although
the result of the competition has not yet been announced,
one thing is certain: the winner of the contest will be
assured of finding work wlth publlshers of the yellow
press In the United states. 3s
Communist songs are varied.

Most of them are written princi-

pally for children and the uneducated masses.

One suoh is "Follow

Mao Tse-Tung," which goes:
Pollow, follow Mao Tse-Tungl
They cannot be American slaves.

• •

• • • •

• • • • • • • • • •

another song 1s called "Party Line":
L1ne, Party Line'
• • • • • • • •• • • • •
The whole world follows party line'
The imperialists are aggressing,
The powerful Russia is insisting peace'
• • • • • • • • • • • •
stalin is Victory,
Mao Tse-Tung i8 victorYl39
P~rty

DurIng the Korean

~far

a literary movement to I'Resist America,

Assist Korea,ft was promoted by Communist writers.

A writer, Chten

Huan-Mei, made a report before "The Artists Resist America, Assist
Korea Propaganda Committee of Middle-south China."

Ch'en's report

advocated that Chinese writers join the anti-American propaganda
3SQuoted in ibid. J p. 3!~.

-

39Referred to Li Pan-yu, Ko Ch'ien You Erh (A Chinese translation of Mark Tennien, No Secret Is Safer; tHOng Kong, 1953),
pp. 107-110. Aocording"'t'lS the prennt Writer Tennien t s translations of Communist songs are not accurate.
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movement.

To quote:

Especially American imperialists • • • have engaged in
deceptive propaganda against Chinese people for many
years. From the American propaganda Chinese people engendered a psychological tendency of pro-America, respecting Amerioa, and tearing America; we have to spread
our propaganda to correct this wrong trend, and we have
to create a psychological wave ot hating Am~rica, despising Amerioa, and belittling Amerioa. This propaganda must be taken in torms ot arts and literature • • •
• We have to ooneentrate all our ettPsts to the campaign
against Amerlc~ imperialists • • • .4
Similar committees had been formed in other cities.

The re-

sult of this movement was that new dances and songs were developed
Here is a song entitled "Beat the Mad Dog":
American imperialist is a mad dog.
Hetll bIte you whenever he sees you;
If you are afraid of him,
His bravery beoomes restless,
It you beat him bitterly,
Hefll be knooked down.
Beat the mad doS,
Seat the mad dog,
Don't let the mad dogblte youl41
During the Korean War Chinese peasants under Communist force
were "voluntarily·t working tor control over the liuen River, which
had caused catastrophes to farms tram year to year.

But the

Communists conveniently tied up this domestic problem with the
Korean War and America.

A song was worked out for encouragement

of peasants, which rans

4°Quoted in Tin Mia, Chung-Kung Wen-Yi Tsuns-Pi-Pen (On
Chinese _C_omm~u~n_1_s_t A£! ~ tlterature), (Hong kong, 1954), P7 166.

41q~uoted in ibid •• p. 167.

-
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American soldiers are mixed-bred sons,
'rheir Korean aggression wi th their defeat will oome along,
The more deteated the madder they become.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
They are weak since they are a paper tiger,
China has full man-power,
First, we have to control the river.
Then we can break up the paper tiger.4 2
Besides the anti-American tones there is also something in
praise of Stalin.

Thirty-two poems written by Kuo Mo-Jo, a famous

scholar and a top offioial of Peking Government, are the most popu
lar.

To show the oharacteristic

to~e

of pro-Russian art we select

several lines:
Stalin, great Stalin!
• • • • • • • • • • •
Thank you grandpa Stalin,
Thank you Soviet uncles,
You have liberated us!
• • • • • • • • • • • •
To you, stalin,
Atomio bomb is a child game,
Germ wartare is a nightmare!
Your vigor can melt the iceland ot the Artie Pole,
Your kindnesw can tertilize the Sahara Desert. 4
Your wisdom can change a river, move a mountainl 3
This sort of songs, or poem, of oourse is looked upon by the
intelligentsia a.s ohildish.

But ohildren walking in the streets,

working on the farms, sing them loudly.

For their future the

Communists look primarily to the young generation.
American social problems are also used for propaganda materia

-

42Ibid., p. 168.
43Ibid., pp. 281-282.
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The

p~opagandists

have

lea~ned

from the Amerioan press the

of drug addiotion, raoe riots. rape,

mu~der,

proble.~

and partioularly

statistios, like the statement by the FBI that in 1950 a major
orime is committed every 18.7 seoonds in the United states.

So a

Chinese Communist author said "there are at least 80 horror broadoasts per week on the major United states radio network."
They know that juvenile delinquency is a ourrent problem in
the United states, and that moving pioture, are said by sociologists to have played a part in its development.

Therefore, the

Chinese Communists waged a oampaign against Hollywood films, from
the end of 1949 to the end of 1950.
~ewspapers a~d

Letters from the "readers" of

magazines blamed the American moving pictures for

Itheir "sins against the state" and for children's misconduot.
~oy

One

had broken his arm, he said, by trying to imitate TarzanJ

~other,

~ilms

who staged a daylight

for the suggestion.

robbe~y,

blamed Hollywood gangster

Murder and detective films, the Commu-

nist press said, "are purposely given the Amerioan public to distraot them from the aoute·and distressing social problems that
oontront them."
The Chinese Communist apparently do not tire of ascribing
'bestial conduct" to the
~ery

Americ~n

troops throughcut the world.

unfavorable incident in whioh Amerioan troops in China were

~nvol ved

during the Seoond '/yorld i,'tar has been preserved and elabo-

rated upon.

The chroniole given to the Chinese people would
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indicate that the American troops limited their activities overseal
to pillage, murder, rape, and beating the people of friendly
nations.

This kind of propaganda is based upon an instruotion

given by the Communist Party in mid-summer of 1951.

The instruc-

tion reads: "In certain cities where American troops were statione(
during World War II accusation of the United states atrocities
should be made.

In accusation of the Unites states • • • inter-

1udes of emphatic speeches are necessary to stress the fact that
American imperialists are brutal • • • • n44
In the United states, of course, as in other countries there
are social classes, and unemployment was a problem in the past.
But the Communists thrIve on exaggeration.

A book stated that

"the Du Ponts gave a ball that cost a half-million U.S. dollars.
The Cigars cost $250 per box tor these capitalists, while the in-

oome of a poor worker in America is only $200 a year."45 Mao Tun,
Minister ot Cultural Affairs, in an article of December 5,

1950,

made the absurd statement that there are over 15 million unemployed in the United states and that millions are on the verge of

starvatIon. 46
Anti-Christianitl ! ! Anti-Americanism
44Quoted in Gretta Palmer, God's Underground ~!!!!, (New
York, 1953), p. 253.
45TennIen, pp. 128-129.
46walker, p. 21.
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Communists know there is an intrinsic contradiotion between
Christianity and Communism.

But they have promised "freedom ot

religious faithtf in their oonstitution and in their general propa_
ganda.

The oondition tor freedom of religious faith must be based

on the Communist Party Line.

!!2

Mao Tse-Tung in his People's Democra·

Dictator.hip indicated that a person who follows the Communist

has demooratic freedom, while a person Who does not follow the
Communists must be oppressed.

To eradicate Christianit¥. especial.

1y the Catholic Church, must inevitably be the Communist aim.

However, Communists have insisted that Christianity in China is
the result of American imperialist aggression.

The Red soldiers

were taught that Christianity was invented by Americans.
In the beginning ot the Red regime the Communist attitude
toward the Protestants was more benevolent than that toward the
Catholics.

In April 1949, the Minister of Education Department of

Peking stated: "'rhe Chinese Communists did not interfere with the
missionary schools.

For example, the president of

(protestant= University is still Dr. Lu Chi-Wei.

Yenching

The only excep.

tion to this rule is Fu-Jen University [The Catholic university]
because the American Catholic priest in charge was very depostlc
as well as

~eactionary,

he was strongly opposed by the Chinese

members of staff, who petitioned that the University should be
taken over. "47

47Quoted in Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems

1n
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China's entrance into the Korean War made things worse tor
Christian schools.

The Communists tinally took over Fu-Jen Uni-

versity on October 12, 1950.
grew tierce.

Following this, anti-Christianity

On Deoember 30, 1950, a statement of Red Government

was issued:
The Government administrative Couneil of the Central People's Government yesterday adopted a "Decision
on Polioies tor Dealing with ~~erioan Subsidized Cultural", Eduoational and Relief Organlzatic·ns and Heligious Bodies." fj,'he polioies which are embodied in a report made at the counoil meeting by Vice-Premier i~uo ;.IoJo, are as follows: First, the Government should plan
and assist people in such a way as to make American subsidized cultural educational and religious relief organizations and religious bodies completely self-sufficient.
Second, American-subsidized cultural, educational and medical organizations should be • • • taken over by the
Government and transformed into state-owned enterprises •
• • • Third, American-subsidized relief organizations
should be c~~pletely taken over and run by the Peoplets
Relief Administration of China. Fourth, American-subsidized Chinese religious bodies should be brought under
~le complete management of Chinese believers.
The
Government should encourage §heir movement to become independent, self-sufficient. 4
Following this government policy, in mid-February, 1951, the
Baptist University of Shanghai a.nd Roman Catholic Aurora University were officially taken over by Government.
Yenching University was seized.

On February 12, 1951

Later, the other nine colleges

opperating with Amerioan funds were taken over.

~

Communist China, p. 176.

48 Quoted

in Richard Arens, "The Impact of Connnunism on Education in China," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, (University ot
Chioago, Chicago, 1952), p. 88.
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The instructions of the Government insisted that all middle
sbhools and universities should sYstematically expose and criticize the "eVil influences of American imperialism's past propaganda activities" in China; and that youthful stUdents were to be enabled to gain a concrete understanding of the "fact" that "Americal
imperialism was a threat to the.Chinese people."49
From 1951 to the end of 1952 a great deal of anti-Christian
literature appeared in magazines and newspapers,

A typical articlE

was \'Il"i tten by a Chinese protestant leader Who was graduated from
Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in the United
states.

The author stated that American missionaries went to Chinl

basically" for political and mili tary invasion. 11

The Boxer In-

demnity, the author asserted, was used, under a pretext of generosity, to train Chinese students conversant with Americans, and to
prepare them for the role of propagandists of the American way of
life. 50

The author in this same article listed the statistics of

the institutions supported by American funds: thirteenuniversities

203 hospitals, 300 orphanages, 2,318 churches, and 2,634 American
~issionaries ... -

... all of these were for the purpose of aggression

against China, according to the author.

He went on in this way:

"The American missionary fitted snugly into the imperialist scheme

49~ •• p. 147.

50 wu You-Tsung, rtNe'u Life for the Chine se Christian Church, f1
People's China, IV, No. 11 (December 1, 1951), 15-17_
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of aggression.
ties.

He lived in a garden-compound with modern facili-

He was boss of his ohurch or Christian organization, • • •

because he controlled its finance which came from abroad together
with its policies.

He walked with an air of superiority to every-

thing around him.,,5l

'l"he statement quoted above is fairly a gene-

ral attitude of the Chinese people toward the Church.

To use a

Chinese Christian leader, a graduate in the United states, to

at~

taok Christianity is, for the Communists, a wise scheme.
After september 1950 the Communists created the "Church Independence Movement."
lios reject the Pope.

This movement demanded that the Chinese Catho
The Communists declared that the Indepen-

denoe Movement was a patr'iotic movement au.d a movement against
American impec·ialism.

'llherefore, as a part of this movement

Communists have acted to force Catholics to sign in support of it.
Acoording to Communist ideology there are close politioal
ties between the Vatican and the White House.

In Communist propa-

ganda literature the Pope is called "imperialist," "running dog of
American imperialism," or tla good friend of the White House."

For

example, an article appeared in Wen Hui Pao, April 7, 1950, whioh
---~

stated: "President Trumants special envoy to the Holy See, Myron
Taylor, does not believe he needs to make an ap'pointment to see
Pope.

He may walk into the papal court and say tIs the Pope at
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The Secretary of the United states in writing to the Pope

home?'

addresses him simply 'Dear friend., f1 52
But there haa been more than just propaganda.

Violent out-

rages have taken place since the start of the Christian Independence Movement.

In early 1951 an American priest in Honan. Provine

was arrested and was it charged that he had a share in the
sibi1ity for the attack on the Boxers in 1900.
him was one million U.S. dollars.

respon~

The punishment for

After the priest sold every-

thing he possessed the Communists forced him to write letters to
the Catholic Mission in Hong Kong for money.

The result .. of

course, was life sentence.
On March II, 1951, five nuna at Canton were arrested and
accused of the murder of two thousand infants in their orphanage
within one year.

Public trial was held to show the "horrors of

the orphanage of the mission."

Two weeks later, an American pries

was put in jail on account of "crueltylt to Chinese Children.

When

a four-year old child died in a Catholic hospital of pneumonia,
two sisters were blamed ror causing this death, by "allowing
scalding'water to burn the child. ItS3
A few weeks later, seven European Sisters were arrested and

tried by the Communists before a crowd of 3,000 Nanking citizens.

52 Quoted in Palmer, God's Undersr9un~ ~ !!!!, p. 215.
53Ib id., pp. 197. 202.

-
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'rhe Communi s ts displayed one hundred corpses ot dead babies,
whioh they had dug up from an orphanage cemetery, before the orowd
as "evidenoe" of the Sisters' "crime."

These Sisters were describ.

ed in the Chinese newspapers as ttAmerican sympathizers and murderers."

The papers also charged that "imperialist nuns give reac-

tionary propaganda to orphans that America will help Chiang KaiShek return. lt54
In April, 1951, an AmeriCan priest was thrown into jail and
in August was put on trial.

His "crimen was reported by the

Communists as that of having burned bodies alive. 55

At Pakhai,

Kuangtung province, an American priest and two Sisters were accuse<
01" "taking out babies' eyes to make medicine."56

There was a more fantastic charge against the Slsters.

In

early 1952, a trial was conducted against six nuns at Chentu,
Szechuan Province.

A Chinese servant of the orphanage, under the

Communist order, "testified" before an audlence of 40,000 citizens
that the Sisters "ate two babies a day when they were fat, three
when they were skinny.u
120,000 orphans. 57

54Ibid.,
55 Ibid. ,

p. 202.

57 Ibid • ,

p. 206.

-

p. 204.
56.!!?!!!., p. 205.

-

They were also charged with the death of
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To the Communist mind such charges are not too fantastic to
be believed.

In rural China there are in circulation

stories regarding people killing people.

superstitiou~

Witch-like women tell

the peasantry that human hearts are sometimes eaten, and human
.yes when eaten make another person's sight better.
cide is prevalent.

Also in£anti-

During the beginning of the Red regime the lo-

cal officials and officers of the cities came largely from the
rural areas, had little education; when they tried to do everythinf
in promoting anti-Christianity aotivities, they were inclined to
be superstitious and ohildish.
It is olear, however, that in the present China the Communist
outrages against the Churoh are fiercer than those ',vhioh occurred
during the earlier period of the Chinese revolution.

Formerly

under the Communist influence and operation the Chinese people
indiscriminately accused all foreign missionaries as imperialLqts.
But now the Communists emphatically teach them that there is close
relationship between the Amerioan imperialism and Christianity.
Practically, the American missionaries in China have suffered the
~ost

severe persecutions.

Obviously the Communist anti-Christiani-

ty movement is following the one-sided policy.
Concerning all the events of the Communist anti-A.1'J1erican and
~rowRussian

program, an expert on the Chinese

Com~unist

movement

indicated that the Hed regime is "the blind alley of totalitarianism," and that at the end o£ the blind alley o£ totalitarianism
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there is nothing but self-destruction or the darkness of a new
barbarian epooh.58

58Harold R. Issao, ItThe Blind Alley of Totalitarianism," The
Annals of the American Aeademl of Politieal and Social Soienee;--

cCtXXVi\Ju1y, 19>1), 81-90.
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CHAPTER V
3UMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Resume of Chanter I, II, and III

------ ~

«

-

--

--- ~

In the first chapter we have described the characteristics of
Chinese anti-foreignism.

It seems clear that an ethnocentric

notion of supremacy made the Chinese, at least from the sixteenth
century, reject and fight foreigners.

Yet the result was that the

,

forei&lers began to infiltrate China, and China had become subject
to foreigners since 1842, as history shows.
Through repeated defeat., China's nationalism grew strong,
though not too effective.
tionary chaos.

Nationalism brought China to a revolu-

Following the revolutionary storm anti-foreign

movement reached a new high tide as discussed in the second ehapte
In the beginning of that chapter we presented an analysis of the
teachings ot Dr. Sun Yat Sen, founder and leader of the Chinese
anti-~perialist

revolution.

Obviously sun Yat Sen was influenced

by Marxism-Leninism, and he in turn brought his influence to the
Chinese intellectuals and revolutionists.
Psychological conditions and

histor~eal

events so mingled tha

the Communists' theories, as cited in the second chapter, seemed
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rather adaptable and practical to the Chinese revolutionary mind.
Thus, the Chinese Communists, with the aid of Moscow, were able to
use nationalism as their ally in oarrying out Communist objectives
Communist spirit activities kept alive the spirit of the
Boxers during the years before 1928.

It is obvious, from Chapter

II, that the Communi sts plot.ted boycotts and riots in the foreign
faotories and conoessions; they aroused the mobs, soldiers, and
stUdents to destroy foreign properties, to murder and expel
foreigners, to attaok "forei8Otl ChI'istianity.

Revolutionary ohaos

pI'evailed, and, a history shows, such condition has always pI'ovlded an opportunity for the Communist development, paI'tioularly so
in China.
AfteI' the Kuo lin Tang began to suppI'ess them fI'om the summeI'
of 1927, the Chinese Communists went to work underground to continue to tan the anti-foI'eign movement.

For student oiroles in

oities the Communists spread propaganda tI'acts and
incite a "patriotic tl movement.

pam~hlets

th~

to

At the same time they started to

train and oI'ganlse the peasantI'Y in rural China to fight toreignerf
In Chapter I and the beginning ot Chapter III we have indicated that basically the Chinese people had---and still have--prejudice against the Japanese.

Coincidently, after 1931, Japan

began to make her new moves against China, step by step.

Hence-

fOI'th, the anti-foreign movement had been oonoentrated on Japan,
as desoribed in Chapter III.
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The Kuo Min Tang Government tried through the League ot
Nations to restrain Japan at least temporarily.

Also Chiang Kai-

Shek believed that the first task ot resistance against Japan
should be to unify China, since there was the existence of the
provincialists and the opposition ot the Communists.

Hhile Chiang

was using persuasive tactics to win control ot the warlords, he
was applying his armed torces in five campaigns against the Chinese
Communists.

At the same time Chiang tollowed a policy ot mollify-

ing the anti-Japanese movement in the cities.

This policy in the

face of Japanese aggression did not meet the public liking.

The

Chinese Communists, therefore, took full psychological adVantage
in its anti-Japanese campaign.

The cry for a "united front agains

Japan" had becqme powerful propaganda, both in the cities and
countryside.
Before the last War the Communists 'Won the "patriots" in the
cities, though the Red Army suffered deeply from the vigorous
opposition of the Kuo Min Tang.

During the War the Communists

again manipulated public opinion, which demanded oollaboration ot
the Kuo Min Tang and Communists tor fUll defense of China against
Japan, and, utilizing the peasantry, expanded the Red Army in rura.
areas.

The Red

A~y,

as a matter ot tact, had not been wholeheart.

edly applied to fight the Japanese; instead it had been kept tor
the bargainning of political power with the Kuo Min Tang atter the
War.

It might be fair to say that the ant1-Japanese campaign had
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sustained the Chinese Communists

tl~ough

several years of hardship

and provided them an opportunity for further development.
Evaluation

~ ~

Communist

Anti-America~

£pogram

Sinoe the Communists came into power they have evolved an
anti-American and pro-Russian program, especially a program which
is destined tolthate America. despise America, and curse America."
In the beginning of the fourth chapter it has been pointed out
that the Chinese, in general, have both a favorable and an unfavorable attitude toward Americans.

The unfavorable attit<.1de,

however, is not rooted in any immediate diplomatic dispute between
China and America.

It has resulted from the Chinese misunder-

standing of American social life, it has been influenced by the
"ooncealed contempt" adopted by Americans in China; and it is
partly a psychological inter.playing of the idea that "foreigners
are pro-foreigners. It

Poli ticall,-, the Chinese people have, at

least, a comparatively favorable attitude toward Americans.

But

the Chinese Communists have indoctrinated the Chinese people to
hate Americans, principally on the basis of the Communists' political bias and historical fabrications.

If the Conmunists stmply

attacked the American way ot life, since this has been traditional

1y misunderstood by the Chinese people, their teachings would probably be more .tfective.
Moreover, the characteristic of the Communist literature 1s
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over-exaggeration which can be seen in any example cited in the
fourth chapter.

Even in attacking the American way of life and

social problem their teachings have deviated too far from facts
and public reasoning.

Human knowledge has always rejected a story

covered with dubious shadow.

It the Chinese Communists should

teach their people in seemingly objective and moderate terms and
attitudes, they might get more or less creqit with the public.

As

a matter fact, an astonishing rumor, which illustrated the Chinese
public wish, was current in Red China during the beginning of the
Korean Warz "Now, America will come back againl"

or

course the

rumor was a dream, but a dream which was dreamed in Communist Chin, •
But more important than over-exaggeration is the enforced
teachings of the "befriend Russia" idea.

Although we did not in-

troduce many examples ot the Oommunist pro-Russian propaganda, the
anti-American program is basically aimed to promote the pro-Russial
movement, which can be seen in the Oommunist interpretations cited
in Chapter IV.

The Ohinese attitude toward Russians is rather a

resentment that has resulted from a history of Russian hostilities
toward China.

Russia, though tactically renouncing all unequal

treaties with the past China in 1918 and 1919, put new pressure on
China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and Russian
privileges in 31nkiang during the Kuo Min Tang

r~gime.

Atter the

World II War the Chinese people have been aware ot Communist
Russia's activities in Arthur, Dairen, and Eastern Railway.

But
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the Chinese Communists have contended that Russian privileges in
Manchuria and other territories are for the benefit of the Chinese.
It is doubtful that such an interpretation could merit credit with
the public for the Chinese Communists.
Psychological reaction on the one-sided policy is inevitable.
Mao Tse-Tung admitted that a "reactionary" trend is prevalent, and
it will continue to eXist. l

A typical reaction is illustrated by

a Chinese Communist popular writer, Hsiao Chiun, who devoted himself to the CCP tor about twenty years.

Hsiao's article "On

Various Imperialiams" appeared in his own ;'fing

!!!!)

in early 1949.

~

f!.2. (Literature

Hsiao posed one main question in attacking

his party: If America represents imperialism, why does not Russia
also represent tmperialism since she has violated China's sovereigrty and she moved away Chinese property from Manchuria?2
that Hsiao was prosecuted.3

The result

At the same time a general purge has

been carried out to conquer any anti-Russian and anti-Communist
attitudes.
The Ghinese Communists might expect that exaggerated "onesided" propaganda will aohieve sucoess among the second genoration.
lMao Tse-Tung, ~ ~ ~

p. 11.

2'1 ing M:lao, ChunS KunS

111-112.

l

!!n ~ Chuan Cheng,
Wing !!. ~ !!.f!m, PP.

3Hsiao t s fate has not been fully known, but there is a
general aggreement among the Chinese intellectuals that Hsiao was
sentenced to death.
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However, how to rsform. suooessfully the "reaotionary" idea already
established is an enormous task for Communists.

A crucial pruge

of "reaotionaries" would achieve the reverse in the long run.
Although governmental policies can decrease and increase Chinese
anti.foreignism, such policy must be based on reality.

During

World War II, the Nanking and Pe1ping puppet governments tried to
create a general pro-Japanese

a~titude,

but it was never achieved.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communists presumably decided
that sinee they successfully incited agitations and riots against
all foreigners including Americans in early period of the Chinese
Revolution, they

wou~d

achieve stmllar successes in an anti-Ameri-

can movement at the present and in the future.

Nevertheless,

peoplets minds might undergo a change, since the situation in the
earlier days cannot be exactly comparable with the present situation.

The point is that the judgement of the Chinese people on

Communism and Communist activities cannot be always the same.
~ommunist
~ublio

The

statement and propaganda were rather consistent with the

demand in view of the former revolutionary chaos.

The

Communist policy at the present time does not appear to conform to
the publicts psychological trend.
A more important point is that the Communists have not taught
their people in this way that ftall foreigners" are imperialists
~gainst

China.

They have singled out that only Americans are

imperialist aggressors against China.

Even Japan, the big enemy
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of China as the Chinese people regarded, has been eliminated from
the CO'U'l1unists' attack target.

For example, when the rearmament

pact was performed by the United states and Japan, the Chinese
Communists organized student and worker demonstrations in various
cities.

Among the slogans used for demonstrations we can only

find "Down with American imperialism. 1t

There is no words like

"Down with Japanese imperialism," which had been used by the
Ohinese Oommunists as an important propaganda weapon fop many yearl •
A current question thereupon has been formed by the Chim se people
in Red China: "What do we have to do with
nothing, though we defeated her?"

Jap~n

since we got

If the Commun»ts should indis-

cr1m1nately act against all fore1gners in man1fest1ng Chinese
nationalism they might be supported by their people in a program
of antl-Americani5m.

or

course, this is antagonist1c to the

foreign pollcy of the Red 'regime.

But a one-sided policy is also

an antagonistlc to traditional Chinese feeling.
Finally, it is certainly not accurate to i.nsiat tha.t Communia1
propaga.nda in China gains nothing.

One result brought about by

the Communist repeated denouncements of the United states should
be pointed out.

When Wu Hsiu Chuan bitterly attacked the United

states in the United Nations, the writer in Hong Kong learned from
his countrymen who are not Communists that "Nhether Communists are
right or wrong, tor one hundred years this is the first eim. China
dares to attaok a foreign powerl ft

Betore the writer came to the
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United states, a Chinese sCholar suggested to him that the Chinese
in the United states would be more respected it they claimed that
they have come to the United states from med China.
Similarly, a Chinese student, who is anti-communist, advised
the writer to adjust himself to live in the United states: ftDon't
fear Amerioans.

Now the Chinese Communists sound pretty loud

against the United states.

Americans fear the Communists.

Chinese'"

1954

In the spring of

We are

the writer interviewed a number

of Chinese students in Chicago to determine the Chinese intellectuals. attitude toward the Communists and Americans.

Persons who

are anti-Communists gave some words like: "China has prestige now,
because Chinese Communists dare to speak to the world,tt "China
really could fight America, a big Power, in Korea:"
We do not know how many Chinese, inside and outside Red China,
Ihold this nationalistic feeling of self-respect, but we do know
there are such Chinese.

The

Chinese Co~munlst leaders might find

that the above attitudes might give satisfaction to their role
played in the international sphere of the present day.

'ro those

Chinese who dislike Communists and yet feel a gain in prestige
caused by the blustering and threats of the Chinese Crnnmunists, it
is a psychological dilemma.
~restige,

\Vhen they think they have gained

they also teel, as often the writer has learned, that

phina is too dependent on HusRia and she has lost something to
~ussia.

By and large, the feeling of national supremacy is still

l~

important among the Chinese people.

The question of whether or

not the Chinese Communists can perfectly satisfy this feeling is
a big task for them.
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